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Article
Market-Based Innovation in Consumer Protection
KELLI ALCES WILLIAMS
In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, low-income borrowers have
been virtually shut out of the housing market. The spectacular failure of overzealous
subprime lending at the beginning of the century is the culprit. Creditworthy
borrowers exist in that underserved population, though regulation and the
continued dominance of traditional banks in the mortgage market have conspired
to deny those borrowers access to credit.
A market solution to this problem exists and is gaining momentum. Financial
technology firms have begun to focus on the borrower experience and to create tools
to help unsophisticated borrowers navigate complex financial products. This Article
takes that trend a step further and anticipates market innovations that will broaden
the population of eligible borrowers. These market innovations can overcome
regulatory missteps to both enhance efficiency and provide meaningful protections
to consumers that regulation has failed to deliver.
This Article makes several contributions to the literature. First, it shows how
mortgage regulation has simply excluded the market participants it was intended to
protect, thereby denying them the social and economic advantages of
homeownership. Second, it shows how fintech has begun to work around those
regulatory limitations to respond to the problems that led to the financial crisis by
offering simpler products directly to consumers and providing more access to
information. Third, it offers a market-based solution to the market and regulatory
failures that anticipates the direction of fintech innovations. Finally, it argues that
the thoughtful application of common law doctrines may be a more effective way to
provide necessary consumer protections while allowing market forces to adapt to
changing circumstances and emerging technology.
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Market-Based Innovations in Consumer Protection
KELLI ALCES WILLIAMS *
INTRODUCTION
Every day, consumers and investors make difficult or complex decisions
that they do not really understand. Within our consumer financial markets,
there are both experts and people who—facing very high stakes—
desperately need help understanding. In a free market, putting those people
together so that the knowledgeable can help the uninitiated should not be
difficult; it should be inevitable. Nevertheless, fundamental problems with
how consumers come to understand products or investments remain and
seem intractable.
The consumer finance market is ripe for disruption. The most significant
financial decision that most Americans make is the purchase of a home. With
the housing market rebounding1 and mortgage regulation likely to diminish,2
the current climate presents an excellent opportunity for enterprising
technology companies to change the way Americans borrow money to
purchase homes. The financial crisis of 2008 and the regulations it inspired
have pushed lenders to be more conservative, effectively drying up credit
for lower-income borrowers. There are profitable credit risks among those
potential borrowers, but the providers of the loans and the potential
borrowers are not connecting.
This Article explains the existence and persistence of these two market
failures in one of our largest and most-studied industries. It anticipates
market solutions given innovative activity in the consumer finance markets
by financial technology (“fintech”) companies and devises a legal
framework that will protect the advances made by those innovators. More
specifically, it argues that over-specificity in regulation has entrenched
expensive, inefficient, and ineffective intermediaries between homebuyers,
sellers, and lenders.
*

Matthews & Hawkins Professor of Property, Florida State University College of Law. For helpful
comments and conversations about this project, I thank Brian Galle, Donald Langevoort, Saul Levmore,
Nadia Nasser-Ghodsi, Manuel Utset, Zachary A. Kramer, and participants in a workshop at the Florida
State University College of Law. I am indebted to Marcos Hernandez, Alexander Purpuro, Christina
Strasser and Taylor Westfall for excellent research assistance.
1
Reuven Glick et al., What’s Different about the Latest Housing Boom?, FRSBF ECON. LETTER
2015-34 at 2 (Nov. 16, 2015) (“[As of 2015], the median house price has recovered to a level that is only
8% below its prior peak.”).
2
See Alan Rappeport & Emily Flitter, Congress Approves First Dodd-Frank Rollback, N.Y. TIMES,
May 23, 2018, at A1 (detailing the first of many promised repeals of the Dodd-Frank Act that, in part,
strengthened mortgage regulation).
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The housing market is a good motivating example to explore problems
with the regulation of intermediaries. Kathryn Judge has highlighted the
ways a variety of market intermediaries build and use political power to
entrench themselves and the high fees they demand.3 This Article draws on
some of her insights to reveal the mess of disloyal intermediaries that the
housing industry has become, lacking anyone clearly motivated to help
consumers. The housing market provides particularly fertile ground for
exploration of these problems because the stakes for consumers are so high
and the practices are so heavily regulated and therefore are firmly
entrenched. Change seems difficult, and yet, various firms are wellpositioned to side-step regulation to provide better services directly to
consumers at a much lower cost than the traditional market.
The market must overcome the entrenchment of real estate and mortgage
intermediaries who do not have incentives, and may not even be permitted,
to serve the interests of buyers. Even the real estate agents who show homes
to buyers and submit offers on behalf of buyers are agents of sellers.4 Over
time, states have enacted regulations to try to balance the duties agents owed
sellers and buyers, but the landscape is still murky and most of the players
misunderstand who owes what duties to whom.5 Once a buyer has succeeded
in signing a contract on a home, she faces the task of quickly procuring
financing. The mortgage lender agent with whom she will work represents
the bank originating the loan, and that bank usually plans to sell the loan to
yet another bank or a group of investors. Agency costs abound, and they
rarely break in favor of the borrower.
Consumer lending, particularly for large loans like home mortgages, is
deeply flawed. Strict regulations prevent innovation in mortgage loan terms
and effectively exclude large portions of the population from qualifying for
home loans at all.6 Consumers still have little or no help navigating the
complex mortgage application process, and many may not know how large
3
See generally Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 573 (2015) (discussing
the influence that market intermediaries exert over business transactions).
4
See Royce de R. Barondes & V. Carlos Slawson, Jr., Examining Compliance with Fiduciary
Duties: A Study of Real Estate Agents, 84 OR. L. REV. 681, 682 (2005) (describing agency in the
traditional model).
5
Ann Morales Olazábal, Redefining Realtor Relationships and Responsibilities: The Failure of
State Regulatory Responses, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 65, 66 (2003) (describing the confusion over agency
between seller and buyer).
6
By its own admission, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau curtailed innovations that might
help consumers by adopting specific regulations for mortgage underwriting. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL
LLP, Regulatory Guidance Regarding FinTech Products and Services: OCC White Paper and New
CFPB Policy Clarify Regulatory Expectations for Financial Institutions and Other Market Participants
5
(Apr.
5,
2016),
available
at
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_Regulatory_Guidance_Regarding_Fi
ntech_Products_and_Services.pdf (explaining the lower fees charged by Redfin as compared to
traditional brokerages).
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of a loan, and what loan terms, are most appropriate for them. We still lack
an understanding of what a truly “consumer friendly” mortgage would look
like. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has called for
innovative approaches that will open the mortgage market to lower-income
borrowers yet again.7 Presumably, market participants have had enough time
to reflect on the financial crisis and have learned valuable lessons from the
mistakes of the early 2000s.
There appears to be a trend in fintech toward developing firms that may
more effectively serve homebuyers. Real estate listing sites offer real estate
agent services at much lower fees than traditional brokerages.8 Mortgage
lenders are devising ways to communicate more quickly with borrowers,
offering them loans with simple terms and lower fees.9 Other firms have
specialized in providing advice to borrowers that is both general and, in
some ways, specific. They have developed internet applications, supported
by the option to chat online with experts, who help home buyers navigate
house hunting, home buying, and the mortgage application process while
also providing access to real estate agents, mortgage lenders, and even
moving companies.10 A firm focused on serving borrowers with different
degrees of creditworthiness might discover an under-appreciated market.
These fintech firms show how a company designed to identify a broader
range of borrowers—including lower-income borrowers—could provide
information, guidance, easy-to-understand loan choices, and support while
matching borrowers to lenders offering loans with appropriate terms. This
Article takes stock of the consumer financial services market and suggests a
natural progression that could lead to such a buyer’s (or borrower’s) side
intermediary (“BSI”). The ideas being tested in fintech right now reveal a
path to an eventual BSI and show how a BSI may serve the needs of
borrowers without compromising the ability to repay lenders. Most
importantly, this Article shows how the development of fintech in consumer
financial services has so far avoided the pitfalls of prior intermediaries. In
particular, fintech firms have not yet successfully lobbied for regulation that
would entrench its position in the market and lead to pernicious pathdependence.11
7

Id. at 4.
See, e.g., How You Save With Redfin, REDFIN, https://www.redfin.com/why-redfin-how-you-save
(last visited Aug. 16, 2018) (claiming a total commission of 4.5% through Redfin, as opposed to a total
commission of 6% through a traditional brokerage).
9
See, e.g., ROCKETMORTGAGE, https://www.rocketmortgage.com/purchase/get-started (last visited
Aug. 16, 2018) (claiming to have “[r]einvented the [a]pproval [p]rocess” and promising loan approval
“in minutes”); SOFI MORTGAGE LOANS, https://www.sofi.com/mortgage-loan/ (last visited Aug. 16,
2018) (offering a “painless” process that simply and quickly provides consumers with funds).
10
See, e.g., DOORSTEPS, https://www.doorstepsbuy.com/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2018) (providing
resources to home buyers with an open channel of communication to real estate agents).
11
See Judge, supra note 3, at 632–33 (noting how intermediaries lobby for regulations that entrench
their positions and the high fees they demand).
8
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To be sure, market forces have failed mortgage borrowers in the past, as
the financial crisis of 2008 is startling proof. The law should not turn its back
on the vulnerable in these significant financial transactions. Fintech firms
are likely to follow in the footsteps of other technology startup companies
to try to change the law to suit their businesses. Uber is a leader in what
Elizabeth Pollman and Jordan Barry call “regulatory entrepreneurship,” that
is, the practice of some firms of making regulatory change a significant part
of their business plan.12 Regulatory entrepreneurship is evidence that
regulation can hamper the market and that businesses may try to influence
lawmakers to enact rules that favor them, often to the disadvantage of other
businesses or even consumers. Pollman & Barry’s observations combined
with Judge’s reveal the dangers of the strong influence of the regulated in
the promulgation of specific regulation. This Article argues that the
relatively flexible common law should dominate to the extent possible, with
regulation only filling the spaces where the common law cannot reach.
This Article makes several contributions to the literature. In order to
make a new observation about the function of regulation and common law
as they apply to intermediaries, it uses mortgage lending as an example
because the mortgage industry is subject to evolving levels of regulation and
is a market that is experiencing real innovation while its relatively
unsophisticated consumers try to find the services they need. The Article
reveals how regulation has perpetuated practices that can harm mortgage
borrowers. It contributes to the literature on fintech and startup firms by
finding new businesses and new practices by established businesses
springing up through the cracks of the traditional system and the regulations
that govern it. Anticipating where these innovations might be headed, the
Article offers a market-based solution to the problems keeping many
potential and new homebuyers from successfully participating in the
mortgage market. Finally, it contributes to recent literature on how
businesses influence the regulations that govern them and finds that the
common law may be best able to protect the vulnerable while allowing
market innovation to flourish.
Part I of this Article explains the problems affecting home buyers in the
current consumer finance market. It begins by explaining the difficulty the
current mortgage market has in balancing ability to repay with access to
funds. In response to the over-lending of the last decade, the “ability to
repay” regulations limiting mortgage lending in the Dodd-Frank Act may
have led to under-lending.13 While ability to repay is important to both
12
Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383,
385 (2017).
13
See Jason Scott Johnston, Do Product Bans Help Consumers? Questioning the Economic
Foundations of Dodd-Frank Mortgage Regulation, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 617, 677 (2016) (“While
there are certainly other factors contributing to some recent trends in the housing market, Dodd-Frank
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lenders and borrowers, too strict a definition can prevent the market from
lending at the optimal rate and under optimal terms.14
Part II explains that we should adjust the way we think of commercial
lending relationships, particularly those that lead to securitized loan
obligations. In those situations, we can think of the borrower both as an
issuer of a security and a buyer of a financial product. As members of a
widely dispersed, poorly represented group in transactions with
sophisticated and/or well-diversified parties on the other side, these
borrowers/buyers do not have the same kind or degree of protection as
similarly situated investors. With large groups of “buyers” on both sides of
most modern mortgage transactions, it is important to have adequate
representation and opportunities for education about the transaction
available for all interests. A real BSI has the potential to do that work, and
new and existing firms are beginning to respond to that need. Specifically
regulating by industry can result in incorrectly categorizing a transaction and
failing to provide appropriate protections.
Part III of this Article explores how intermediaries who are in positions
to help unsophisticated consumers have failed to do so and explains how
regulation failed to prevent, and possibly even perpetuated, the harm.
Learning more about those intermediaries and attempts to deliver different
kinds of services to borrowers will help us anticipate the next BSI and to
design it in such a way as to avoid the pitfalls of the past. It particularly takes
issue with the mortgage broker design and holds mortgage brokers up as an
example of the expensive and harmful effects of specific regulation of
intermediaries whose allegiances are not truly aligned with the buyers they
purport to represent.
Part IV takes stock of the consumer finance market and anticipates likely
next steps. It focuses on the kinds of services firms are beginning to offer
and what consumers seem to want. Part V then proposes a business model
for a BSI. The BSI imagined by this part of the Article may never exist and
its specific contours are not the Article’s aim. Rather, thinking through how
such a firm should operate and how the market could lead to an intermediary
that helps buyers more and is still profitable helps us understand the proper
role of the law in solving the significant problems posed by our current
methods of guiding consumers through difficult financial transactions.
Part VI argues that a common law framework best supports the
beneficiaries of intermediaries’ services. It explains how common law
has likely decreased subprime mortgage lending, increased renting, and has led to an increase in other
types of lending.”); Adam J. Levitin et al., The Dodd-Frank Act and Housing Finance: Can It Restore
Private Risk Capital to the Securitization Market?, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 155, 171–72 (2012) (detailing
how, during the housing bubble, mortgage lenders overpriced mortgages whereas, after Dodd-Frank,
there is a persistent problem of underpricing the risk).
14
See Johnston, supra note 13, at 678–79 (describing how a rigid definition of the ability to repay
has substantially limited the types of mortgages offered to poorer and higher risk consumers).
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principles can protect consumers and avoid regulatory capture that has
plagued the industry in the past. Finally, it argues that specific regulation
may be necessary in some circumstances, but that that regulation must be
limited to addressing problems that the common law cannot. Before enacting
regulation that will apply to one industry, we must ask why the law is not
already addressing the particular problem. And if we discover that it simply
cannot, only then is specific regulation recommended.
I. FAILURES IN THE LENDING MARKETS
A surplus of mortgage loans in the early 2000s caused a bubble in
housing prices that led to the 2008 financial crisis. When that bubble burst,
creditors were no longer able to cover the loans they had made by
foreclosing upon homes, consumers could not use equity in the homes to
refinance, and borrowers who had received loans they could not realistically
repay defaulted in large numbers.15 Lenders were unable to recoup their
losses. An active derivatives market left most major American financial
institutions exposed to the significant losses in the mortgage markets, which
were on the brink of failure.16
A number of behavioral biases and poor predictions by borrowers and
lenders17 caused the over-lending problem.18 Both borrowers and lenders
relied on the faulty assumption that housing prices would rise forever.19 The
assumption that home values would serve as adequate collateral for any loan,
no matter how risky, supported the decision to consummate a number of
dubious loans. The securitization of loans also contributed to over-lending.
15
See Brian J.M. Quinn, The Failure of Private Ordering and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 5
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 549, 567 (2009) (“As marginal borrowers who were now forced to pay higher rates
began to default on their mortgages, the air quickly came out of the real estate bubble as subprime
borrowers were forced into foreclosure.”); Steven L. Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial
Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 549, 551–52 (2009) (“When home prices stopped appreciating, these borrowers
could not refinance; in many cases, they defaulted . . . . These defaults in turn caused substantial amounts
of low investment-grade mortgage-backed securities to default . . . .”).
16
Indeed, two major investment banks did fail: Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns. Edward J.
Estrada, The Immediate and Lasting Impacts of the 2008 Economic Collapse—Lehman Brothers,
General Motors, and the Secured Credit Markets, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 1111, 1116 (2011).
17
“Lenders” in this Article refers to the source of capital for mortgage loans. Lenders may be banks
or fintech firms or other private firms and are often ultimately the purchasers of mortgage-backed
securities.
18
See Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1121–22 (2009) [hereinafter Bar-Gill, Mortgage Contracts] (finding that the
complexity of mortgage contracts misleads the “imperfectly rational” borrower); Susan Block-Lieb &
Edward Janger, Demand-Side Gatekeepers in the Market for Home Loans, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 465, 466
(2009) (“Conflicts of interest and gatekeeper failures on the supply side led to overlending [sic]. But
errors in consumer decision making and the absence of demand-side institutions to protect consumers
also led to overborrowing.”).
19
Melissa Schulz, Note, VI. The Subprime Crisis: A Breeding Ground for Litigation, 27 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 307, 308 (2008); Schwarcz, supra note 15, at 550.
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Because the originators of loans were not holding them for repayment, nor
servicing the loans themselves, they lacked “skin in the game” and had
incentives to originate risky loans that they could then package with safer
loans and sell to investors as mortgage-backed securities.20 If housing prices
had increased as everyone assumed they would, borrowers would have been
able to use the equity in their homes to refinance their mortgages on more
favorable terms. Mortgage originators21 could sell the loans off long before
repayment became a concern—indeed, before payments were due in many
cases. Even holders of mortgage-backed securities felt protected by the
diversified portfolio of loans they held and their ability to recover the value
of unpaid loans from foreclosure sales.22
Professor Oren Bar-Gill has explained in detail how lenders framed
mortgage loans in terms that would exploit the behavioral biases of
borrowers to entice them to take loans that looked inexpensive early in the
loan term, but ended up being less affordable in the long term.23 Lenders
were able to make loans seem affordable by designing mortgage products
with low upfront costs, such as interest-only loans24 or adjustable-rate
mortgages.25 These loans often contained pre-payment penalties that
significantly increased the cost of refinancing, high overall interest rates, and
high penalty fees to which low-income borrowers were more likely to
succumb than others.26 Bar-Gill argued that the ability of lenders to take
20
Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 6–7 (2011); see
also Gary Gorton, The Panic of 2007 68 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14358,
2008), www.nber.org/papers/w14358.pdf (acknowledging “originate-to-distribute” as the idea that
“banking has changed in such a way that the incentives have been fundamentally altered”).
21
Mortgage originators may be the banks that are lending the money and either keeping the loan
themselves or selling it to another financial institution. They may also be mortgage brokers. The
mortgage originator is the party that guides the borrower through the application process and identifies
the loan the borrower will receive.
22
Zachary A. Kisber, Reevaluating MERS in the Wake of the Foreclosure Crisis, 42 REAL EST. L.J.
183, 187–88 (2013) (“By the 2000s, mortgage-backed securities, many of which were subprime, were
sold and traded in large volumes on the secondary market.”).
23
Bar-Gill, Mortgage Contracts, supra note 18, at 1109–10.
24
The borrower only pays the interest on the mortgage through monthly payments for a fixed term.
Once this term is over, the borrower will either refinance his/her home, make a lump sum payment, or
begin to pay off the principle of the loan. Margaret Graham Tebo, Unconventional Wisdom, 91 A.B.A.
J. 49, 52 (2005); see also Bar-Gill, Mortgage Contracts, supra note 18, at 1076 (“Interest-only loans and
payment-option ARMs allowed for zero or negative amortization during the introductory period, further
increasing the step-up in the monthly payment after the introductory period ended.”).
25
ARMs are mortgages with an interest rate that can change periodically. This change occurs
“usually in relation to an index, and payments may go up or down accordingly. . . . It’s a trade-off—you
get a lower initial rate with an ARM in exchange for assuming more risk over the long run.” FED.
RESERVE
BD.,
CONSUMER
HANDBOOK
ON
ADJUSTABLE-RATE
MORTGAGES
4
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201204_CFPB_ARMs-brochure.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2017); see
also Bar-Gill, Mortgage Contracts, supra note 18, at 1098–99 (detailing how the alternating interest rate
resulted in substantially increased mortgage payments).
26
Bar-Gill, Mortgage Contracts, supra note 18, at 1101–02.
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advantage of these behavioral biases led to more lending to low-income
borrowers and on much more disadvantageous terms than the market could
sustain.27
More generally, the financial services and lending markets are hard on
low income, subprime borrowers. The natural entropy of the market seems
to lead to giving subprime borrowers loans they cannot afford and could
never hope to repay while profiting from high fees and interest payments.28
Industry after industry—from payday lending29 to car sales to higher
education30—has sought out borrowers with risky credit profiles, promised
them access to cash, opportunities, and/or ways out of poverty, only to
saddle them with debts equal to several times the amount of principal
borrowed.31 Borrowers with debilitating debt loads often dig even deeper,
assuming they could never repay anything they borrow, so they are
borrowing as much as they can just to stay afloat.32 They begin to rely
heavily on the income stream provided by debt and fall farther into financial
ruin.33 These tendencies of both lenders and borrowers seem opposed to the
goal of finding and lending to responsible, low-income borrowers loans they
can reasonably afford to repay.
Without government intervention, predatory lending seems almost
inevitable. Any hopes that lenders have incentives to be repaid are dashed
when the reality of subprime lending reveals the opposite. Securitization of
consumer loans removes the connection between the original lender and the
27

Id. at 1121–22.
See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7–11 (2008)
(arguing the consumer credit markets are failing because imperfectly rational consumers have imperfect
information and cannot avoid agreeing to credit contracts that are harmful to them); Elizabeth Warren,
The New Economics of the American Family, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 34–37 (2004) (noting the
extremely high interest costs and fees associated with subprime loans relative to prime loans and
describing the marketing strategies that targeted subprime borrowers and encouraged them to engage in
expensive refinancing of their mortgages).
29
See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 28, at 44, 55 (explaining how consumer irrationality pervades
the payday lending business); LISA SERVON, THE UNBANKING OF AMERICA: HOW THE NEW MIDDLE
CLASS SURVIVES 77, 81 (2017) (noting that payday loans are illegal in fifteen states); Creola Johnson,
Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1, 98 (2002) (referring to
payday lending as “economic exploitation”).
30
See Susan Dynarski, A Conveyor Belt of Dropouts and Debt at For-Profit Colleges, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 28, 2016, at BU6 (explaining that the loans many students take at for-profit colleges often lead to
default).
31
Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 28, at 34–35, 44; Johnson, supra note 29, at 26.
32
See Derek Thompson, Your Brain on Poverty: Why Poor People Seem to Make Bad Decisions,
ATLANTIC (Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/11/your-brain-onpoverty-why-poor-people-seem-to-make-bad-decisions/281780/ (discussing research that finds that
persistence in pursuing long term goals, such as saving, can be affected by the decision maker’s
perception of the long term—how long they have to wait and if they think saving will ever be effective).
33
Id. (citing Anandi Mani et al., Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function, 341 SCI. 976, 976–80 (2013),
which reports findings that living in poverty has a similar cognitive effect to losing an entire night’s sleep
and adversely affects the decision making of poor people).
28
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eventual repayment of the debt. Fees and high interest rates compensate
lenders beyond the repayment of principal.34 Indeed, the credit card industry
has long known that cardholders who pay their balance in full every month
are not a source of income for the company.35 When regulation tries to rein
in predatory lending, lenders simply reinvent it.36
Government regulation responds as each new instance of predatory
lending gains prominence, but market forces seem incapable of stopping
predatory lending practices before they reach large numbers of borrowers.
Borrowers seem unable or unwilling to select away from predatory loans. It
is possible that lenders and borrowers both understand that a subprime
borrower is already in financial trouble, desperately needs capital, and is
unlikely to be able to repay any loan. Lenders have to make sure that they
are able to profit, and borrowers only need to secure financing, no matter the
source or the terms. A borrower will not go to jail for a failure to repay
debts.37 Bankruptcy is available often enough; debt collectors can be
prohibited from calling.38 If borrowers are going to freely borrow more
money than they can repay, lenders might think they need protection.
Designing terms to assure profits of some variety is what lenders receive for
making capital available to people who would otherwise be barred from
many sources of economic advancement. In these subprime markets,
borrowers and lenders alike are behaving opportunistically. Under such
34
See James H. Carr & Lopa Kolluri, Predatory Lending: An Overview, in FINANCIAL SERVICES
IN DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES: ISSUES AND ANSWERS 31, 31–32 (Fannie Mae Found. Ed., 2001)
(discussing the high interest rates associated with predatory lending).
35
E.g., How do Credit Card Companies Make Money — The Business Model, WALLETBUDDY
(May 10, 2017), https://medium.com/walletbuddy-insights/how-do-credit-card-companies-makemoney-the-business-model-d4892d301ac3.
36
For-profit higher education seems to be at the forefront of convincing people to borrow money
they cannot afford to repay by promising a future that will help them repay it, knowing full well that the
likelihood of a profitable future is extremely low. Stephanie Riegg Cellini & Nicholas Turner, Gainfully
Employed? Assessing the Employment and Earnings of For-Profit College Students Using Administrative
Data (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22287, 2018). For-profit colleges are usually
not able to offer their students the same kinds of future employment opportunities as their betterestablished non-profit counterparts. Id. Still, federally subsidized student loans fund tuition for
educational programs regardless of the quality of the school, its reputation, or its ability to place graduates
in jobs after graduation. Unscrupulous schools attract students and their ability to bring in federal dollars,
then watch as those students, rather predictably, drop out of the program before completing it or are
unable to find a job that allows them to repay the loans. See Dynarski, supra note 30 (noting that it is not
the lender—the federal government—that is necessarily taking advantage of students, but the school that
is taking advantage of both the borrower and the lender by promising a profitable future it cannot deliver).
37
Matt Tatham, Can You Go to Jail for Not Paying Your Bills?, EXPERIAN (Dec. 12, 2017),
https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/can-you-go-to-jail-for-not-paying-your-bills/.
38
Can a Debt Collector Try to Collect on a Debt That Was Discharged in Bankruptcy?, CONSUMER
FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (updated Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/can-adebt-collector-try-to-collect-on-a-debt-that-was-discharged-in-bankruptcy-en-1425/; See also 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692d (2012) (noting that a debt collector may not make phone calls “repeatedly or continuously with
intent to annoy, abuse, or harass”).
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circumstances, it seems as though predatory lending is a sort of
equilibrium.39
If it is an equilibrium, it is not a healthy one for lenders, borrowers, or
the credit markets as a whole. Businesses that do not add value are propped
up on the government’s dime in the case of federally guaranteed loans.
Unaffordable extravagances are funded with more enthusiasm than basic
necessities, rendering basic necessities more difficult to afford as debt
accumulates. Inability to repay debts is not always life-altering, but evictions
and home foreclosures are significant hardships. Once the cycle of overborrowing begins, it is difficult, if not impossible, to end without a bailout
from a third party—often the government, through federal guarantees or the
availability of bankruptcy protection—with all of the moral hazards that
entails for both sides of the transaction.40
Thus, it would appear that not all equilibriums are net social benefits.41
Subprime borrowing and industries built around giving low income, low
credit score borrowers the illusion of participating in the middle and upper
classes create negative externalities.42 Borrowers might behave differently if
they could properly appraise the future payoffs. A strong optimism bias
prevents borrowers from accurately pricing their future payoff from
borrowing money on the offered terms. For-profit education is a strong
example of this problem. Even if low post-graduation employment numbers
are reported accurately, optimistic students believe they will complete the
program and be one of the lucky few to secure a high-paying job.43 More
generally, it is often easy to believe that we will make more money in the
future, that income will increase over time, and that job prospects will
39

If the economy experiences a downturn, mass defaults could keep these arrangements from being
profitable for predatory lenders at all. Someone has to be able to pay them something.
40
David M. Herszenhorn, Congress Approves $700 Billion Wall Street Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
3, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/business/worldbusiness/03iht-bailout.4.16679355.html.
41
Often, in collective action situations, “the socially optimal outcome is not automatically
achievable as the Nash equilibrium of the game.” AVINASH DIXIT & SUSAN SKEATH, GAMES OF
STRATEGY 356 (Ed Parsons ed., 1st ed. 1999).
42
Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 516 (2005).
43
This miscalculation applies to more traditional, non-profit education as well where students pay
large sums for programs that offer low probabilities of well-paying employment in the future. The New
York Times has covered this phenomenon extensively. See, e.g., The Editorial Board, Keep For-Profit
Schools on a Short Leash, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2017, at A22 (noting that for-profit schools must get ten
percent of their revenue from somewhere other than federal loans, and part of this ten percent can be
private loans). Some for-profit schools offer the loans themselves, but charge high fees and interest rates.
Id. One of the most well-known examples is ITT Technical Institute, which was sued in 2015 for fraud.
Id. See also Erica L. Green, For Students Swindled by Predatory Colleges, Relief May Only Be Partial,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2017, at A17 (discussing Corinthians College, which has a similar story to ITT
Tech). The day before the Trump administration took office, the Obama administration approved $450
million of full loan relief. Id. Now, under the Trump Department of Education spearheaded by Betsy
DeVos, the students who expected the full relief may only receive partial loan relief. Id.
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improve with more education and stability. Information asymmetries and
optimism biases prevent many borrowers from accurately pricing a loan’s
costs and benefits.44 Both default on the loan and the tremendous burden of
trying to make payments on it can cause severe negative externalities, such
as reliance on social welfare programs, decreased productivity, increased
costs of credit for all borrowers, and in extreme cases, harm to the credit
markets or the economy.45
The regulatory reaction to these problems in the mortgage markets was
to try address the information asymmetry without attempting to correct the
optimism bias.46 Congress included regulation of the mortgage industry in
the Dodd-Frank Act47 and created the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau.48 The goal of the regulatory response was to make credit safer for
consumers.49 The Dodd-Frank Act, among other things, requires lenders to
try to determine a borrower’s ability to repay mortgage loans.50 More
broadly, the CFPB is responsible for ensuring that consumer financial
products are safe for consumers by regulating against “unfair, deceptive, or
abusive ads and practices.”51 The CFPB has broad authority to regulate
consumer credit transactions and the sale or service of a variety of financial
products.52
Both regulatory regimes take steps to limit the kinds of loans available
to consumers in the interest of providing only “safe” products to
consumers.53 For instance, the Dodd-Frank Act requires mortgage lenders to
determine before approving a loan that the borrower has the “ability to
repay” loan at the time it is consummated.54 Lenders find a safe harbor from
this requirement when they make what are known as “qualified” loans whose
44

Barr, supra note 42, at 534.
See Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749,
781-89 (2008) [hereinafter Bar-Gill, Consumer Contracts].
46
Id. at 765–68.
47
The Dodd-Frank Act’s contributions to mortgage regulation were enacted in various sections of
the Truth in Lending Act, the Department of Housing and Urban Development Act, the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
of 1989, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act. Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 11-203, 124 Stat. § 1376 (2010).
48
The CFPB was formed to protect consumers in financial transactions. Adam J. Levitin, The
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 334–35
(2013) [hereinafter, Levitin, The CFPB].
49
Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 28, at 98 (proposing the agency that would become the CFPB,
and that one of its authors would head, as a way to ensure the safety of financial products for consumers).
50
124 Stat. § 1376.
51
Levitin, The CFPB, supra note 48, at 337.
52
Id. at 344–46.
53
12 C.F.R. § 1008.1 (2018).
54
The lender must make a good faith determination to this end by collecting and analyzing
documents relating to the borrower’s financial condition and must consider the borrower’s ability to
repay all aspects of the loan: taxes, fees, insurance on the home, as well as the principal and interest
payments due for the life of the loan. 124 Stat. § 1376.
45
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terms fall within specified parameters of affordability and predictability.55
The safe harbor for qualified mortgages ensures that consumers can
understand and afford the highest payments they will have to make during
the life of the loan, that the term of the loan does not extend beyond thirty
years, and that the accompanying interest rate “points” and other fees do not
exceed a threshold level.56 With these restrictions in place, lenders are more
likely to give prime loans (usually those accompanied by a twenty percent
down payment, no or few points, and long term monthly payments that are
safely within the borrower’s ability to repay) than sub-prime or “Alt-A”
loans.57
Rather than helping low-income, less-savvy consumers borrow more
safely, the regulations seem to have prevented them from borrowing at all.58
While discerning a consumer’s ability to repay debt is important, so is
ensuring that the consumer understands the terms of a loan and the
consequences of various payment scenarios. Imposing liability on lenders
for taking risks on lower-income consumers means denying access to credit
to those consumers, many of whom would be able to repay the loans if they
were given the chance. 59 Sensitivity to the fact that new regulations may chill
lending too much and leave part of the population without meaningful access
to credit has led the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the CFPB
to ask lenders to devise innovative products that will allow lower income
populations to have access to credit without imposing the widespread and
55

Id. § 1412.
Id.
57
“Alt-A” loans are “‘medium risk’ loans between subprime and prime” loans. Bar-Gill, supra note
18, at 1089.
58
See Patrick T. O’Keefe, Note, Qualified Mortgages & Government Reverse Redlining: How the
CFPB’s Qualified Mortgage Regulations Will Handicap the Availability of Credit to Minority
Borrowers, 21 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 413, 432 (2016) (discussing how minority borrowers with
particular loan-to-debt ratios may become delinquent on their loans); Patrick Barnard, Hispanic Market
Represents Huge Opportunity for Mortgage Lenders, MORTGAGEORB (Oct. 5, 2016),
https://mortgageorb.com/hispanic-market-represents-huge-opportunity-for-mortgage-lenders (“It has
been estimated that more than 50 million creditworthy borrowers were shut out of the mortgage market
in the aftermath of the financial crisis, mainly due to stricter underwriting standards resulting from
increased regulation.”); Henry Grabar, The Rich are Getting More Mortgages. The Poor are Getting
More
Car
Loans,
SLATE:
MONEYBOX
(May
19,
2017,
4:51
PM)
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2017/05/19/the_rich_are_getting_more_mortgages_the_poor_ar
e_getting_more_car_loans.html (“[B]ecause expensive debt goes where it can, and has flowed into the
auto loan business . . . from the more tightly regulated mortgage industry . . . . [m]ore than [sixty] percent
of new home loans go to borrowers with super-high credit scores, a record since record-keeping began
in 2003 and double what the share was then.”)..
59
A borrower’s inability to satisfy the current debt-to-income ratio does not mean that the borrower
will not be able to repay her mortgage. O’Keefe, supra note 58, at 432 (“When loan-to-value ratio,
total loan amount, and a borrower's credit score are all considered during the underwriting process,
borrowers with a debt-to-income ratio between [forty-three and forty five percent] were only slightly
more likely to become delinquent on loan payments than borrowers with a debt-to-income ratio between
[thirty-six and forty percent].”).
56

2019]

MARKET-BASED INNOVATION IN CONSUMER PROTECTION

169

60

systemic risks subprime loans did in the early 2000s. The balance is
difficult to strike and the regulatory agencies seem to be interested in using
market innovation to help reach it, recognizing that a balance, not just onesided prime lending, is an important goal.
The goal seems to be to induce lenders to provide consumer-friendly
loans. A consumer-friendly loan is one that a consumer is reasonably likely
to be able to repay on time and without incurring penalty fees. Because
individuals not only differ in their financial resources, but also their
spending habits, the degree of financial assistance they receive from family
and friends, and their future earning potential, discerning a consumer’s
ability to pay is more of an art than a science. Some information, like
contributions from family members toward a down payment, could and
would be disclosed, but creditors have learned that even very risky loans are
often repaid eventually and such loans are often very lucrative for lenders.61
Borrowers also benefit from the access to credit provided by risky loans
because it allows them to achieve a standard of living that may have
otherwise been unavailable to them. Thus, it is not beneficial to either
borrowers or lenders to limit mortgages to only “qualified” or “safe”
mortgages. A “risky” loan may still be “consumer friendly.” Providing credit
to low-income borrowers or those with low credit scores has always been a
difficult proposition.62 The recent financial crisis is evidence that too many
such loans can cause serious systemic problems. Still, a “consumer-friendly
approach” balances access to credit and a responsible attitude toward
repayment.
The focus of the regulatory response on disclosure has been ineffective
because the disclosures are too long and detailed for consumers to be able to
read and understand and because the disclosure of mere terms of a loan, even
if it is intelligible, does not overcome an optimism bias that may tempt
borrowers to agree to loans they cannot repay. The understanding and
accurate evaluation of the information is just as important as its receipt. In
turn, understanding loan terms, interest rates, monthly payments, and fees is
helpful, but it still does not overcome biases about how much a borrower
will be able to afford over the life of the loan. Forcing lenders to explain to
borrowers what lenders know about a particular borrower’s

60
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, FAIR LENDING REPORT 24–26 (Apr. 2016), available at
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201704_cfpb_Fair_Lending_Report.
pdf.
61
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of
Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1258 (2002).
62
Christopher P. Guzelian, Michael Ashley Stein, & Hagop S. Akiskal, Credit Scores, Lending,
and Psychosocial Disability, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1807, 1811-24 (2015) (discussing the multitude of barriers
to receiving credit that low-income individuals face).
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creditworthiness, as suggested by Bar-Gill, would address this problem.63
Lenders are able to predict with some accuracy which borrowers will have
to pay late fees and how often. They know which loans are most likely to
default and when. This information is included in the interest rate, but often
disguised or manipulated in adjustable rate loans or interest only loans or
hidden in fees the borrower may be convinced she will not ever incur.
Communicating to a borrower directly that a loan has an x percent chance
of defaulting or that a loan is in the x percentile of the riskiest loans may
make the point more plainly.
This Article addresses the problem created by the regulatory response to
the role subprime lending played in the financial crisis. Poor borrowers do
not understand many of the mortgage terms they must choose among and do
not understand how a given mortgage might affect them financially in the
short or long term. Meanwhile, there is no one responsible for explaining
mortgage terms and their consequences to these less sophisticated
borrowers, and they are without representation in the most complex financial
transactions of their lives. Because the problems created by lending to
subprime borrowers are so systemically harmful, the response has largely
been to simply stop lending to them.64
Improving upon the system of intermediaries available to facilitate
mortgage transactions will be an important step in making mortgage loans
more widely available and more successful. Under-lending to subprime
borrowers excludes a large portion of the population not only from the
financial and emotional benefits of home ownership,65 but also from making
valuable contributions to the economy. Banks and large lenders are
concerned with systemic risk. They need to ensure only that their portfolio
of loans does not fail; they are insensitive to the risks of any individual loan.
Individual borrowers bear the greatest risk of loss if they default on their
loans and are forced from their homes by foreclosure. Because the
sophisticated parties making most of the decisions in the mortgage process
do not bear much, or any, individual risk with the success or failure of
individual loans, the borrowers who shoulder the bulk of the risk of loss are
at a severe disadvantage. Paradoxically, they have the most to lose yet
exercise the least control over the process. Further, consumers do not buy
63
Bar-Gill, Consumer Contracts, supra note 46, at 797–800 (pointing out that credit card issuers
have information and models that will predict how a consumer will use the card and incur fees and
suggesting that that information be shared with, or at least priced for, the consumer).
64
The FHA still provides some refuge for those with poor credit and those who want to loan them
money. It insures loans to people with low credit scores and/or those making small down payments,
provided they show signs of financial responsibility such as having made timely payments on all of their
obligations for a particular period of time. FHA Loan Requirements: Important FHA Guidelines for
Borrowers, FHA.COM, http://www.fha.com/fha_loan_requirements (last visited Oct. 14, 2018).
65
See William M. Rohe & Mark Lindblad, Reexamining the Social Benefits of Homeownership
After the Housing Crisis, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUDIES HARV. UNIV. 1, 21 (2013),
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/hbtl-04.pdf (citing studies finding that owning a
home gives a people a sense of stability which reduces stress and helps them manage hardship).
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homes often, so they are not able to realize the benefits of being repeat
players in the mortgage market. While lenders are able to perfect their
strategies over time and are able to develop relationships with real estate
agents and others who may send borrowers their way, borrowers are not able
to realize those advantages. Working toward developing an intermediary
who can be a repeat player in service of borrowers may be valuable as long
as that intermediary is prevented from being captured by lenders. A legal
framework to support the use of BSIs can help to provide that protection.
II. CHANGING THE WAY WE THINK ABOUT CONSUMER DEBT
First, it will help to understand that mortgage borrowers are both buyers
and sellers in a loan transaction and to appreciate the incentives the various
parties to a mortgage transaction have. There are two ways to think of the
relationship between mortgage borrowers and lenders. One view labels
mortgage borrowers as issuers who are “selling” or “issuing” debt. This is
the securities law paradigm.66 Borrowers are issuers or sellers, and lenders
are investors, or buyers, of promissory notes. The other view, used by
consumer law, labels mortgage borrowers as buyers who are purchasing
mortgages, which are complex financial products.67 Lenders are selling
mortgage products and borrowers are buying money at a price and under
terms set by lenders.
The difference is important because we usually think of sellers as having
an informational advantage over buyers. We design disclosure rules and
define representatives in response to a belief that buyers must be able to
overcome some informational asymmetries with sellers. With regard to
mortgage lending, both views are accurate. Both sides of the transaction
require information from the other that the law would rather the parties not
be able to conceal. Both are relatively vulnerable to sharp dealing by the
other at various points in the transaction. A solution that appreciates and
balances the two views is likely to lead to more efficient lending and
borrowing than one that sees borrowers as only vulnerable or lenders as the
only party requiring information to make an investment choice.
Securities law views borrowers as sellers. When a party wants to raise
money from the capital markets on credit, that party is considered the
“issuer” of the debt security, and the lenders purchase the securities the
issuer offers. Issuers are subject to significant and often expensive
registration requirements, so it stands to reason that consumer notes are not
66
See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 66–67 (1990) (explaining that a note will be considered
a security if: (1) it has an investment purpose; (2) it is from a common trading investment; (3) the public
expects the note to be a security; and (4) the Securities Acts are necessary to reduce the risk associated
with the note).
67
See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 28, at 9 (discussing the uninformed yet rational consumer’s
understanding of sellers).
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considered securities. It would be impractical to consider consumer
borrowers “issuers” for the purposes of the notes they “sell” to lenders.68
The liability that attaches to the issuer of a security would be prohibitive for
most consumers. For this reason, commercial law and consumer protection
law govern consumer loans while securities law only regulates loans made
to businesses for investment purposes.69
For the most part, commercial law does an adequate job of regulating
the rights and responsibilities of consumer borrowers and lenders once they
have entered a lending relationship. It also governs lending transactions
between banks and businesses, focusing most of its regulatory effort on
payment methods and the use of security for loans.70 Bankruptcy law
supplements the commercial law governing debtors and creditors by
determining a borrower’s rights vis-à-vis its creditors and creditors’ rights
vis-à-vis other creditors when a borrower cannot pay all creditors as
agreed. 71
But there is a gap in helping the vulnerable buyer navigate the
negotiation of the terms of the complex financial product. The commercial
law, focused on lending transactions, does not respond particularly well to
problems with negotiating loans, either with regard to the terms that apply
to the loan or ways to ensure an unsophisticated consumer’s understanding
of those terms. These issues are mostly addressed through special regulation
relating to consumer loans, such as the Truth in Lending Act.72 The common
law of contract can respond to some of the problems posed by negotiation
between parties of vastly different sophistication by refusing to enforce loan
agreements that involve fraud, misrepresentation, or unconscionability.73
But as more loans and other kinds of contracts become more standardized
and consumers become more accustomed to ignoring boilerplate terms,
traditional contract law is less effective at protecting consumer borrowers
from sophisticated lenders. Attempts to specifically regulate disclosure of
contract terms and loan terms to consumers have succeeded mostly in
making disclosures longer, thereby making consumers feel more
68
See Reves, 494 U.S. at 66 (“If the note is exchanged to facilitate the purchase and sale of a minor
asset or consumer good, to correct for the seller’s cash-flow difficulties, or to advance some other
commercial or consumer purpose . . . the note is less sensibly described as a ‘security.’”); United Housing
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 850–51 (1975) (finding a share of stock carrying a right to
subsidized housing was not a security because “the inducement to purchase was solely to acquire
subsidized low-cost living space” and not to invest for profit).
69
Reves, 494 U.S. at 67.
70
Id.
71
See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 28, at 74 (discussing how consumers can be protected by
contract law and bankruptcy law).
72
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667.
73
Nolo, What Makes a Contract Valid?, FORBES (Nov. 20, 2006, 2:46 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/2006/11/20/smallbusiness-statelaw-gifts-ent-lawcx_nl_1120contracts.html#2f03146e6aff.
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comfortable and protected, whether or not they actually are. Some
regulations have specifically addressed permissible terms of certain kinds of
loans—notably mortgage loans—but fall short of encouraging market
conditions that can lead to the creation of innovative loan products that allow
low-income borrowers safe and responsible access to credit. Despite
regulations designed to protect them, unsophisticated, inexperienced
borrowers are either shut out of large consumer loans or have significant
difficulty understanding the risks associated with the decisions they have to
make in choosing the right loan terms.
Because of the different paradigms we’ve used for thinking about
securities law and large-scale consumer lending, the two bodies of law have
been hesitant to draw from one another. Borrowing consumer law’s view of
borrowers as buyers will allow us to apply lessons from securities law to the
similar situation presented by the current mortgage lending environment. In
mortgage markets, just as in securities markets, unsophisticated consumers
are buying a complex financial product. The securities law has focused on
creating conditions that protect unsophisticated investors from being taken
advantage of at the hands of more sophisticated “sellers.”75 For example, the
securities laws and the market conditions upon which they rely interpose
learned intermediaries for securities offerings to individual investors and
between issuers and individual investors on the secondary market. In the
primary market, where securities are initially offered to investors, the issuer
must either file a registration statement with the SEC before offering the
securities to the public,76 or demonstrate that the securities are being offered
privately to a few sophisticated investors—or, in some cases—investors
with a sophisticated representative.77 Further, the extensive disclosure
system mandated by securities regulation assumes that sophisticated
intermediaries, usually analysts and institutional investors, read and digest
the complex disclosures issuers make. Individual investors are not expected
to read and understand these disclosures themselves, but are deemed
protected by them because they are trading in a market informed by
professional analysis of that detailed information. The consumer finance
market mandates disclosure and tries to regulate what kinds of consumers
74
See BEN-SHAHAR AND SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF
MANDATED DISCLOSURE 666–67 (2014) (finding that mandated disclosure rarely works, as most people
assume that they can safely ignore most disclosures and lack the literacy to analyze them anyway); see
also Angela A. Hung et al., Final Report, Effective Disclosures in Financial Decisionmaking, RAND
CORP. 13–14 (2015), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1270.html (noting that disclosure
used in isolation may not provide investors with enough support to make informed decisions).
75
C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities Laws, 6 DUKE L.J.
1081, 1083 (1988).
76
15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2012).
77
See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2015) (noting that § 77e does not apply to transactions which do not
“involv[e] any public offering.”).
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can be given access to which products, but fails to rely on or even suggest
sophisticated intermediaries who can make investment judgments for
inexperienced consumer borrowers. None of this is to say that securities
intermediaries are perfect, only that some of them have helpfully focused on
compensating for investors’ lack of understanding of complicated
disclosures. Consumer finance intermediaries have not yet evolved to serve
the same purpose.
Mortgage borrowers have a collective interest and a collective action
problem just as securities holders do.78 The mortgage products banks made
available to them are designed to appeal to a large number of borrowers.
Each product, or set of mortgage terms, is designed for borrowers with
particular characteristics, but may also be sold to borrowers in varying
financial circumstances depending on the judgment of individual mortgage
lenders. Securities investors are a similarly diverse group facing decisions
about buying expensive, complex financial products. The securities
regulations have sought to protect investors based on their common
vulnerabilities while leaving room for markets to discover the best precise
terms upon which investors can purchase securities.
The complete picture of modern mortgage investment is more complex
than identifying the one seller and one buyer of a financial product.
Borrowers are also issuers and public investors are still buyers of debt.
Because mortgages are securitized, there is a traditional securities
transaction after the mortgage product is sold to the borrower. A mortgage
lender, typically a national bank,79 securitizes a group of mortgages and sells
interests in the income stream from a group of mortgages to securities
investors.80 Investment banks may also purchase and securitize mortgages,
underwriting their own issuance of mortgage securities.81
There is some concern that agency costs affect the interactions between
the mortgage originators and the ultimate purchasers of mortgage-backed
securities.82 Because they are planning to immediately sell the mortgages
they negotiate with borrowers, mortgage originators may be less concerned
about a given borrower’s ability to repay. Indeed, many blame this state of
affairs for the housing market bubble in the 2000s.83 Some Dodd-Frank
78
See Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal for
Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 278–79 (2003) (“Dispersed shareholders unable to act
collectively allow opportunistic managers to expropriate large private benefits of control. Any single
shareholder who expends additional resources in monitoring management or coordinating with other
shareholders to change management will typically bear the costs alone . . . .”).
79
Either the original lender or a bank that buys mortgages from originators can serve this purpose.
80
Victoria V. Corder, Homeowners and Bondholders as Unlikely Allies: Allocating the Costs of
Securitization in Foreclosure, 30 NO. 5 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 19, 20 (2011).
81
Id.
82
See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 20, at 8 (noting the inherent agency problem within the growth
of consumer debt securitization).
83
Adam J. Levitin et al., supra note 13, at 157.
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regulations, such as those requiring that originators keep some “skin in the
game” seek to alleviate that difficulty,84 but commentators worry that those
regulations are not enough.85 Agency costs between the loan originator and
the ultimate MBS investors mean the investors may be buying riskier
products than they would otherwise, and because they cannot see the details
about all of the borrowers who are obligated on the mortgages making up
the security’s income stream, they are riskier products than they realize. This
second information problem, in addition to the agency problem, persists
even after Dodd-Frank and may discourage private investment in the credit
risk associated with mortgage loans.86
The models that have emphasized the agency problem in the mortgagelending context have described the mortgage originators as the agents and
the investors in mortgage-backed securities as the principals.87 This is so
even though these “agents” are sellers vis-à-vis MBS investors just as they
are “sellers” of mortgage products to borrowers. Given the structure of the
transaction, there is very little reason to think the mortgage originators are
any more the agents of MBS investors than they are agents of borrowers. In
both situations, the originator is selling a complex financial product to a
buyer who does not have as much information about the product or the likely
outcome of the transaction as the originator does. In both situations, the
originator has an important informational advantage both with regard to the
particular transaction, but also with regard to the market in similar
transactions overall. Again, our traditional understanding of debt
relationships stands in the way of seeing the relationships as similarly
situated and applying similar principals to resolving their similar problems.
Creditors are not agents of borrowers, nor should they be. Creditors
make decisions about whether to lend money and how much to lend based
on their own financial interests. The fact that there is or could be a conflict
of interest between the borrower’s interests (in obtaining a loan) and the
creditor’s interests (in being repaid) is obvious to all involved. In the
84

Id. at 158.
See generally id. (arguing that Dodd-Frank reforms that serve as “skin-in-the-game” credit-risk
retention fail to solve the informational problems in the housing market). Specifically, the proposed
bonding function where banks retain credit risk on securitized assets is likely insufficient because
“investors cannot determine where a bank is competent at evaluating the risk on mortgages.” Id. at 162.
Therefore, Dodd-Frank is merely “replac[ing] one informational problem—that of securitization—with
another—that of financial conglomerates.” Id. Further, providing investors with large amounts of loanlevel data will have limited benefit “absent proven credit risk models that can make sense of the
relationships between the different variables disclosed.” Id. at 173.
86
Id. at 159–60. Credit risk, they say, is made up of both the risk of default and the risk associated
with the severity of loss upon default. Id. at 157. Interest rate risk, on the other hand, is simply the risk
assumed by all lenders that market interest rates will go down. Id. at 169. At the moment, the government
takes on almost all credit risk associated with mortgages, while private investors stick to interest rate risk.
See id. at 156–57.
87
Id. at 226.
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mortgage market, the original lender’s lack of skin in the game creates a
conflict of interest with both the borrower and the ultimate purchaser of the
loan or the investor in an MBS containing the loan. That conflict is less
obvious to the borrower. Lenders who are going to sell the loan to a third
party have incentives to make riskier loans and so are not necessarily
protecting their interest in being repaid. The Dodd-Frank Act tries to
mitigate that problem by emphasizing the ability to repay in loan origination
and by imposing “skin in the game” requirements for mortgage originators,
but the fact remains that a securitization lending model complicates the
mortgage originator’s incentives beyond a borrower’s assumptions or even
understanding.88 While not justifying anything like a fiduciary duty, the fact
that borrowers cannot see or anticipate a given originator’s incentives in
making a loan means that the borrower lacks an important understanding of
what the approval of a loan means and how the borrower should decide
which loan product makes the most sense for her.
Before thinking through the design of a BSI that could better guide
buyers through the mortgage process while also expanding access to credit
and preventing large-scale foreclosures, we should first consider other uses
of intermediaries in similar circumstances. Understanding the legal and
regulatory pitfalls those intermediary systems encountered will help us to
avoid those mistakes in the future.
III. THE TROUBLE WITH INTERMEDIARIES
Intermediaries abound. Salespeople and retailers of all stripes help
consumers purchase products from manufacturers. Various brokers and
agents facilitate more complex transactions. Lawyers and courts serve as
intermediaries between citizens and the civil and criminal justice systems.
As noted above, Kathryn Judge has written about the lobbying power of
intermediaries and how they can use their political and market influence to
entrench high fees, even as those fees are inefficient and corrupt their
incentives.89 Of particular note for our purposes is the confusion around real
estate agents. While Judge focused on fees, we will turn our attention to the
buyer’s understanding of the homebuying experience and to how courts have
responded to a tangle of state regulations to try to honor the expectations and
protect the vulnerabilities of buyers. This Part will also look at the mortgage
broker, a position that was designed to represent buyers in the mortgage
borrowing process, helping them select a loan and complete the application.
Finally, it will consider the work of securities underwriters, largely for the
purpose of borrowing from the dual roles underwriters play to inform the
design of a potential BSI later in the Article. Securities regulations are very
88

Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26 YALE J. ON
REG. 143, 161 (2009).
89
Judge, supra note 3, at 641.
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different from the market solutions to the mortgage borrower’s difficulties
this Article is most concerned with. But studying the design of the
underwriting process and how the expectations of underwriters are managed
can be helpful to thinking about how to design intermediaries in similar
situations.
A. Real Estate Agents
Most people are mistaken about how real estate agency works.90 There
is a widespread assumption, even among real estate agents, that the selling
agent—that is, the agent that shows the buyer the house and submits the
buyer’s bid—represents the buyer.91 Traditionally, the listing agent is an
agent of the seller and the selling agent is a subagent of the seller.92 Many
states realized that this arrangement left the buyer unrepresented and both
the buyer and selling agent confused.93 Buyers would often tell selling agents
the most they were willing to pay for the house and the selling agents,
contrary to their duty to the seller, would not pass that information on to the
seller.94 The truth of the arrangement left buyers completely unrepresented,
often without their knowledge, because all agents were supposed to be
cooperating to sell the house for the seller. This cooperation among agents
seemed necessary to allow agents to openly share information about
listings.95 Another justification for the arrangement is the notion that the
seller pays the agents’ commissions out of the sales proceeds. Of course,
sellers demand more money from buyers in the first place because they
factor in the costs of real estate commissions. To say that only the seller pays
the commissions does not quite tell the whole story. Granted, the buyer is
only willing to pay so much, and once the seller finds the most the market
seems to be willing to pay for her house, real estate commissions must be
paid out of that total. But it seems obvious that if real estate agents did not
exist, housing prices would be noticeably lower.96 Buyers therefore incur
some of the cost of real estate commissions. And yet, they are not necessarily
90

See Barondes & Slawson, supra note 4, at 682 (noting that common assumptions about real estate
agents may be erroneous).
91
Id.; Paula C. Murray, The Real Estate Broker and the Buyer: Negligence and the Duty to
Investigate, 32 VILL. L. REV. 939, 949–50 (1987); Olazábal, supra note 5, at 72–73.
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Murray, supra note 91, at 939–40; Olazábal, supra note 5, at 72–73.
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Barondes & Slawson, supra note 4, at 683–84.
94
Id. at 694.
95
The advent of the Multiple Listing Service, a subscription-based service where all homes listed
by realtors were collected and shared with all other licensed realtors, gave rise to the subagency
arrangement. See Olazábal, supra note 5, at 73–76 (describing the role of MLS in mandating the
subagency structure). The National Association of Realtors “agreed to eliminate seller-subagency as a
condition of participation in a regional or local multiple listing service” in 1992. Id. at 74–75; Matthew
Collette, Sub-Agency in Residential Real Estate Brokerage: A Proposal to End the Struggle with Reality,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 406–08 (1988).
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Judge, supra note 3, at 585–86.
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represented by anyone in the transaction.
Recognizing that buyers are at a disadvantage both in their lack of
representation and in their informational disadvantage vis-à-vis the seller,
states have regulated home buying. Many regulations focus on mandating
disclosure about the homes to be sold. Sellers simply must disclose and
warrant the condition of certain elements of the home they are selling.97
Regulation has also addressed the lack of buyer representation. States have
taken different approaches, all aimed at allowing some kind of direct
representation of, or help for, buyers in varying degrees.98 Some can fully
act as buyers’ agents, while others may only perform ministerial acts such
as submitting bids or making appointments.99 Some states have given up on
direct fiduciary representation of buyers and sellers entirely, designating real
estate agents as “transaction brokers” who are beholden to the transaction
itself, rather than to representing either party.100
These regulatory responses try to solve the problem of how to provide
representation for both sides of a transaction where both parties are
unsophisticated, and where the same agents or agency may be doing the
work on both sides. The newer, specific regulations have failed to resolve
the confusion about who represents whom because the regulations vary by
jurisdiction and seem to complicate technicalities rather than resolve more
fundamental questions of who truly represents the interests of [and helps]
each party.101 Only regimes that provide for separate agents for buyers and
sellers with clearly disclosed roles can overcome confusion about what the
role of a real estate agent is. Anything short of designating a separate agent
to represent each party in a transaction is bound to result in confusion and
some disloyalty to—or mistreatment of—one side of the transaction or the
other.
Courts have been able to provide remedies for buyers, state regulation
and industry practices notwithstanding. Some have found a fiduciary
relationship even when the broker and buyer did not specifically enter into
an agency relationship.102 Others have done so by imposing obligations on
agents to be “honest,” “fair[],” and “ethical” in dealings with buyers even
where no agency relationship was established. These requirements were
97
Murray, supra note 91, at 946; George Lefcoe, Property Condition Disclosure Forms: How the
Real Estate Industry Eased the Transition from Caveat Emptor to Seller Tell All, 39 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 193, 198–99 (2004).
98
Olazábal, supra note 5, at 75–76.
99
Id. at 76–79, 86.
100
Id. at 87–88.
101
Id. at 130–31. The entire article is a critique of specific state regulatory attempts to solve the
problems caused by the seller subagency system. Olazábal stresses that the regulatory response may have
solved individual, particular problems, but may not have considered the big picture and may therefore
have left unfortunate consequences of the operation of the real estate agent law and practice unremedied.
102
Murray, supra note 91, at 957 (citing Harper v. Adametz, 113 A.2d 136, 189 (Conn. 1955)).
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based on a “public interest” theory—that real estate agents and brokers owe
duties to the community to behave in an ethical manner that does not harm
the buyer by, for example, not communicating a buyer’s bid to the seller or
by misleading the buyer in fraudulent ways.103 Still others have provided
remedies to buyers for a failure of a broker to disclose key information about
a property, relying on theories of misrepresentation.104 Despite formal
practices and the definitions of agent loyalties provided by statute, courts
have still been willing to find remedies for buyers who have been treated
poorly in their interaction with real estate agents who purport to work for
sellers. The courts have been able to, on an equitable basis, provide a remedy
where regulation failed to even provide clarity.
The fact of the matter is that real estate agents are most loyal to the
transaction. That is, they want the deal to close.105 They want houses to sell.
More sales mean more commissions. High prices are nice, but higher volume
is nicer.106 This tendency by real estate agents harms sellers in that it
prevents them from getting as high of a price for their home as they might
be able to obtain if they waited longer.107 It harms buyers to the extent agents
may encourage buyers to buy any home quickly rather than waiting for the
right home at the right price to come on the market. Representing her own
interests, a real estate agent imposes agency costs on the transaction and does
not have incentives to learn and pursue the best interests of either party.
Pushing everyone to say “yes” can be detrimental when “yes” is the wrong
answer for one or both sides of the transaction. When thinking about the
optimal characteristics of a true buyers’ side intermediary, it will be
important to design incentives that are not tied to closing just any deal. But
first, we turn to another intermediary in the home buying process: the
mortgage broker.
B. Mortgage Brokers
Mortgage brokers are only used in about twelve percent of mortgage
transactions.108 This is in contrast to mortgage brokers’ participation in the

103

Id. at 960–63.
Id. at 964–84; see also Lefcoe, supra note 97, at 199 (describing common law remedies available
to homeowners when sellers fail to disclose “known material latent defects (as defined by courts over
time) not readily observable to buyers”).
105
Steven D. Levitt & Chat Syverson, Market Distortions When Agents Are Better Informed: The
Value of Information in Real Estate Transactions, 90 REV. ECON. & STAT. 599, 599 (2008) (noting that
real estate agents have strong incentives to sell houses quickly).
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Id.
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Id. at 599–600.
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Lenders 101, DOORSTEPS, https://www.doorstepsbuy.com/learn-more/2/lenders-101 (last
visited Oct. 14, 2018).
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majority of mortgage loans in 2002. They have fallen out of favor with
both lenders and borrowers. They once held the promise of being BSIs,
learning about a borrower’s credit qualifications and budget, then choosing
from a large portfolio of loan options to find the right one for each specific
borrower.110 Because they had access to a variety of loans, brokers could
often find more or better options for lower-income borrowers.111 As is often
the case, the problem with mortgage brokers and their incentives arose from
how they were paid.
Mortgage brokers are often paid with origination fees, which are paid in
cash by the borrower at closing.112 In order to allow borrowers to pay the
mortgage broker’s fee over the life of the loan with their regular monthly
mortgage payments, mortgage brokers used to be paid by yield spread
premiums. A yield spread premium is in addition to the interest rate a
borrower pays on a loan.113 The mortgage broker is paid from the
premium.114 This form of payment allowed mortgage brokers to disguise
their fee from borrowers and to receive more than they would have by simply
charging an origination fee.115 It also gave mortgage brokers incentives to
stick borrowers, particularly riskier borrowers, with much higher interest
rates than they would otherwise have to pay. They could tell borrowers that
the excess interest was in their best interest because it lowered the amount
of cash due at closing, which was an appealing option to lower-income
borrowers. Some brokers collected cash from borrowers and yield spread
premiums from lenders. It was not necessarily made clear to borrowers how
much they were paying and why.116
The Dodd-Frank Act banned yield spread premiums.117 Now, mortgage
brokers can be paid with lender credits, which function slightly differently.
Mortgage brokers may still add to the loans’ interest rate, and they receive a
109
Howell E. Jackson & Laurie Burlingame, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of Yield Spread
Premiums, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 289, 290–91 (2007) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN
DEV. OFF. POL’Y DEV. & RES., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND INITIAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ANALYSIS
FOR RESPA PROPOSED RULE TO SIMPLIFY AND IMPROVE THE PROCESS OF OBTAINING MORTGAGES TO
REDUCE SETTLEMENT COSTS TO CONSUMERS 12 (2002)).
110
See id. at 291 (describing the wide range of services provided by most mortgage brokers to assist
borrowers with selecting the appropriate loan products).
111
See id. (describing the lender and customer relationships of the average mortgage broker, which
typically reviews the offerings of at least a dozen lenders and makes recommendations that are usually
accepted by the customer).
112
Id. at 289–90.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 291–92.
115
Id. at 295–96 (reporting that mortgage brokers were paid significantly more—sometimes two or
three times as much—when paid via yield spread premium rather than in cash with an origination fee).
116
Id.
117
15 U.S.C. § 1639b(c)(1) (2018) (“[N]o mortgage originator shall receive from any person and
no person shall pay to a mortgage originator, directly or indirectly, compensation that varies based on
the terms of the loan (other than the amount of the principal).”).
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commission from lenders, but they cannot collect both a lender credit and an
origination fee from the borrower, and they must disclose the lender credit
clearly to the borrower.118
Unfortunately, the new lender credit regime still does not solve the
problem that mortgage brokers are paid by lenders nor does it address the
conflict of interest inherent in the fact that mortgage brokers are bound to
have closer relationships with lenders than with borrowers because they
have repeated interactions with lenders. Further, the fact that mortgage
brokers are paid as a percentage of the loan value encourages them to
approve loans for higher principal amounts, regardless of the borrower’s
budget.119 The ability to just add to the interest rate and amortize the loan
over decades means that large differences in costs are made more palatable
to borrowers. None of this is necessarily illegal, nor should it be, provided
there is sufficiently clear disclosure. But it is not necessarily considerate of
the borrower’s best interests, and mortgage brokers retain some perverse
incentives even after the Dodd-Frank Act’s intervention.
C. Securities Underwriters
Understanding that securities investors and mortgage loan applicants are
buyers of important, expensive financial investments120 allows us to draw
useful comparisons to securities offerings. There, the intermediary of
interest is the underwriter. Underwriters negotiate with issuers on behalf of
securities investors to investigate the issuer and the proposed offering, to
price the offering and negotiate its terms, and to bring the security to the
public market.121 The price of the security depends not only on the value of
the company’s equity or the strength of its borrowing position, but also on
any other advantages securities holders may have. For instance, bondholders
may benefit from any collateral that secures the loan or the seniority of the
position of their tranche of debt, or particular covenants that give the
bondholders rights against the firm or its management in times of financial
distress. Preferred shareholders may benefit from special rights to dividend
payments, the ability to convert their shares to common stock, or voting
rights. The underwriter’s goal is to negotiate a security at a price and with
118

Id.
Indeed, some lenders have vowed to stop accepting loans originated by mortgage brokers
because they find that lender-originated loans are less likely to default. Marcie Geffner, Banks Cut Off
Mortgage Brokers, BANKRATE (Apr. 2, 2009), https://www.bankrate.com/finance/mortgages/banks-cutoff-mortgage-brokers-1.aspx.
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See supra Part III.
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There are a variety of different underwriting relationships available. Most common is the “firm
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from the issuer and then sell those securities to the market. John S. D’Alimonte, The Letter of Intent and
Basic Structure of an Offering, in SECURITIES UNDERWRITING: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 94 (Kenneth
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terms that will be marketable to the public. If the terms the underwriters
negotiate for the security are not appealing to investors, the underwriters will
not be able to unload their shares and will lose money and significant
investments of time.
Like listing agents, underwriters are retained and paid by issuers,123 so
they have incentives to work on an issuer’s behalf to price and deliver
securities to the market at a price that will support liquidity in the firm’s
securities. Unlike real estate agents, underwriters generally guarantee the
IPO price of a stock by purchasing the stock themselves to maintain the
initial offering price.124 The issuer’s and underwriter’s interests are aligned
in wanting to offer securities, a species of financial product, to the public on
terms that will be desirable to investors. However, allegiance to the issuer
also presents opportunities for capture of an underwriter by the issuer.125 Not
only does the issuer select and pay the underwriter, but the issuer may also
use other segments of the underwriter’s business. For instance, an
investment bank that serves as an underwriter may have a retail investing
division that operates mutual funds which the issuer could use for retirement
plans.126 The underwriter may also be so hungry for underwriting business
that it is willing to give the issuer a break in order to keep the engagement.127
Before the enactment of the Volcker Rule,128 which bars proprietary trading
122
Wendy Gerwick Couture, Price Fraud, 63 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 21–24 (2011); see also Arthur B.
Laby, Differentiating Gatekeepers, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 119, 132–33 (2006) (describing
the role of the underwriter in advising the issuer on steps it can take to make its securities offer “more
attractive” to buyers).
123
The issuer initiates the process by engaging the underwriter to promote the distribution of
securities. This conversation typically predates the securities offering, with the managing underwriter
acting as an advisor on many issues pertinent to the offering. The underwriter acts in something of a
fiduciary capacity with the issuer but also may have a direct or indirect financial interest in the offering
because its fee is tied to the success of the offering at hand and the performance of each offering affects
opportunities with future issuers. Laby, supra note 122, at 132–33.
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See Joe Nocera, Facebook’s Brilliant Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/26/opinion/nocera-facebooks-brilliant-disaster.html?_r=0 (using the
Facebook public offering to explain IPOs).
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Work?, 79 TUL. L. REV. 859, 869–71 (2005); see also Laby, supra note 122, at 133–34 (“[U]nderwriters
continue to have an interest in cultivating the client relationship to obtain additional consulting and other
work.”); Jeremy McClane, The Agency Costs of Teamwork, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1229, 1238 (2016)
(comparing prices of an IPO when issuer’s counsel has worked with the underwriter in the past to when
they have not worked together).
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See Barondes, supra note 125, at 870.
127
See Laby, supra note 122, at 133–34.
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12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012). The rule was enacted as part of Dodd-Frank to prevent banks from
making certain speculative investments to the detriment of their customers. Five agencies jointly issued
final regulations implementing the Volcker Rule. See Keith R. Fisher, Volcker Rule Agencies Issue
Interim Final Rule Exempting TruPS-Backed CDOs, 67 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 337 (2013) (listing
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by underwriters that would directly conflict with underwriting business, an
underwriter may have had an independent equity stake in the issuer for
whom it was underwriting an offering of more equity securities.129
Underwriters are notorious for over or underpricing securities.130
Underpricing a security allows the underwriter’s insiders to make a quick
profit by trading IPO shares on the open market early in trading.131
Overpricing shares may be an attempt to capture a larger fee than an offering
warrants and disserves early investors in the issuance. The cost of
overpricing is borne directly by investors with no benefit to the issuer. An
underwriter’s various interests may compromise its ability to serve as an
effective gatekeeper. Attempts to discipline underwriters through
regulations provide more examples of specific regulation having limited
utility and the failure of regulations focused on disclosure to control
behavior or incentives.
Intermediaries can add value by offering the benefit of their reputations
to the parties they connect. Issuers can realize important benefits from the
value of an underwriter’s reputation among investors.132 If investors can
generally trust that a given underwriter has negotiated a fair deal for
investors at an appropriate price, they will be more willing to purchase the
security, and secondary market trading of the security will take off with the
IPO price as a starting point. The success of prior offerings helps issuers
when they return to the capital markets for funding in the future.133 When
issuers are able to offer reliably liquid markets in their securities, investors
are more likely to want to purchase them. Retaining a well-regarded
underwriter to sign on to an offering is an important part of securing public
financing.134
While reputation is important to the value of a securities underwriter,
reputations take time to build and have proven again and again to be an
insufficient guard against opportunism by intermediaries. Many of the
players responsible for the spate of financial fraud in the early aughts—such
129
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as rating agencies, securities analysts, and auditors—were supposed to rely
on their reputations to maintain credibility and stay employed.135 The risk of
losing their good reputations did not keep them from engaging in massive
fraud or misrepresentation.136 So, while a valuable check, reputation alone
is not enough to prevent capture by an intermediary and is certainly not
enough to ensure that intermediary’s competence. Part VI will suggest other
legal mechanisms for preventing capture of BSIs by lenders and ensuring
that BSIs do not defraud lenders in their eagerness to extend credit to new
borrowers.
As all intermediaries do, underwriters impose agency costs on the
securities offering process. Market forces, such as the effect of an
underwriter’s reputation on the success of an offering, can help lower agency
costs, but do not eliminate them. The dual role the underwriter serves and its
vulnerability to capture by issuers makes it difficult to monitor the
underwriter’s behavior and to figure out whether the underwriter is overpricing or underpricing securities for self-interested reasons.
IV. MARKET ADVANCES
Markets often create new intermediaries as they grow. New start-up
firms devise better ways to bring transacting parties together and to represent
the interests of each. There are firms in the consumer finance market,
including the firms described below, that are well-positioned to help home
buyers in various stages of the process, particularly in deciding how much
money to borrow and on what terms. No firm has become a pure BSI,
however.
A BSI could solve the primary problems this Article has identified with
the mortgage lending process. A BSI could help borrowers understand the
terms of their loans and the short and long-term consequences of the
mortgage terms to which they agree. It could also expand access to credit
among lower-income markets by finding good credit risks among the
borrowers currently shut out of mortgage borrowing. The presence of BSIs
could improve borrower representation as they convince lenders to simplify
loan terms and lower the costs of identifying worthy borrowers by applying
improved techniques for evaluating creditworthiness. All of these worthy
goals are in reach, as demonstrated by the work of the firms considered in
this Part of the Article.
This Part of the Article explores developments fintech firms have made
in helping consumers borrow money and buy homes. It considers what their
work tells us about the existence of a market for these kinds of services and
the gaps the market seems ready to fill with innovative business practices.
135
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These new firms, or old firms growing into new areas, show potential for
disrupting a field long dominated by tradition and strict regulation.
A. Peer-to-Peer Lending—A False Start
One consequence of the 2008 financial crisis was a steep decline in the
availability of credit to individuals and businesses of all kinds and at all
levels of wealth. Banks were not making loans, and when they did, they were
not taking chances. As the sharing economy was gaining steam connecting
those willing to help with consumers needing assistance, a similar practice
took hold in financial services. Fintech firms tried to connect individual
borrowers, seeking small loans for consumer purposes, with individuals
willing to loan money to borrowers about whom they could learn via the
lending platform.137 This arrangement is known as “peer-to-peer” (“P2P”)
lending. Its goal is to serve “moneyball borrowers,”138 that is, borrowers who
may not have the hallmarks of prime borrowers, but who would be good
credit risks anyway. P2P lending platforms could allow lenders to make a
different kind of investment—to realize a return on loans usually only
available to banks—while at the same time providing a way for borrowers
with weaker credit profiles to access capital. There was money to be made
and help to be found in the business the banks were refusing.
When consumers had trouble putting together enough of a credit line
from a credit card or had trouble borrowing enough money from a bank on
an unsecured basis, they turned to P2P loans. Most P2P loans were relatively
small. A borrower may have wanted a loan to buy a car or to refinance credit
card debt on more favorable terms. Early P2P loans were as small as
hundreds of dollars and involved a high degree of contact between borrower
and lender.139 Individual borrowers would post their request for a loan online
along with personal details about themselves and what they wanted to use
the money for.140 Lenders could “shop” among borrowers and select a
borrower who wanted a loan of the appropriate size and whose story
resonated with the lender.141 Compared to banks, lenders in a P2P were more
137
Kathryn Judge, The Future of Direct Finance: The Diverging Paths of Peer-to-Peer Lending
and Kickstarter, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 603, 604 (2015).
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Beane focused on statistics to find underappreciated baseball players who were overlooked by scouts but
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(2004).
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willing to take bigger risks and to make loans on more favorable terms to
borrowers because they were able to get a more personal sense for a
borrower’s creditworthiness.142 Borrowers could turn to the lending
marketplace for loans when it did not seem worthwhile to go to banks or
when credit card interest rates were too high.
Over time, peer lenders wanted the same degree of creditworthiness
upon which banks insisted.143 P2P lenders started to use the same metrics as
banks, and P2P lending platforms began to serve more as underwriters of
debt securities than as online spaces for individual borrowers and lenders to
find each other.144
Now, borrowers apply for loans on one part of the site, and accredited
investors sign up on another part to invest in debt securities put together by
the online lender.145 Lender-investors are assured that they are investing in
quality loans. No longer does a member of the middle class decide it would
be fun to invest $200 in someone else’s dream and surf over to the Lending
Club to find the right recipient of their funds.146
Fintech innovation has come to mortgages as well. Because of the size
of mortgage loans and the regulations that attend mortgage loan origination,
marketplace lending for mortgages is not direct P2P lending. Instead, the
fintech company finances the loan, securitizes its mortgage portfolio, and
allows accredited investors to invest in its mortgage backed securities. These
firms, such as SoFi, may try to attract borrowers with high credit scores by
promising social interaction with other borrowers (and with SoFi executives)
or by offering only three or four loan products with simple terms.147
Borrowers may feel like they are borrowing with and from friends, and so
they may feel more comfortable with the process, trusting SoFi more than
they would a bank. This may be an important way for fintech mortgage
lenders to compete with banks. Competing first for the borrower’s trust and
142
Colleen Honigsberg et al., How Does Legal Enforceability Affect Consumer Lending? Evidence
from a Natural Experiment, 60 J.L. & ECON. 673, 681 (2017) (describing the proprietary models used by
marketplace lenders to rate the risk of particular loans while assessing the risk of various credit
investments differently than banks would, and using more information than a simple credit score).
143
Judge, supra note 137, at 605.
144
Id.
145
E.g., SoFi Mortgage Loans, SOFI, https://www.sofi.com/mortgage-loan/ (last visited Aug. 25,
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2018).
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Judge, supra note 137, at 619 (“[T]oday’s lenders have no direct relationship with the borrower
receiving the funds provided. Rather, they have a claim only against the lending platform. . . . Thus, when
looking at the structure of the relationship—as opposed to the expected return on the investment—it
begins to look a lot more like a traditional bank.”). There are platforms for such largess, but those more
closely resemble crowdfunding (such as www.Gofundme.com) than traditional loans given in
untraditional ways.
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then providing simple, transparent loan terms the borrowers can easily
understand would provide a more consumer-friendly experience than
traditional banks offer.
Other innovations in the mortgage lending space have used the
technology provided by the Internet to streamline and simplify the
application process. For example, Rocket Mortgage, owned by Quicken
Loans, promises to give applicants simple loan choices appropriate for their
circumstances.148 While these new approaches can be useful and save time,
they fall short of offering borrowers different kinds of loans than other banks
offer or more advice. They have focused on streamlining rather than
disrupting the mortgage process.
P2P lending and marketplace mortgage lending have identified holes in
the traditional credit markets that lenders and investors in debt securities are
willing to fill. P2P lenders have shown that some lenders may be willing to
lend on a smaller scale to Alt-A or subprime borrowers for lower interest
rates than traditional banks.149 Fintech firms may also be willing to help
individuals reorganize their credit after banks have given up. They may also
have identified an appetite borrowers have for a more personal experience
and for more confidence that the loans they are agreeing to are affordable
and understandable. Combining these insights might point to where new
BSIs could start.
Finding ways to lend to low-income borrowers without government
involvement is difficult. Private sources of capital simply do not have to take
the risk and so choose not to. Fintech’s attempts to reach underserved
borrowers have failed to disrupt, or even significantly change, the consumer
lending industry.150 While there may be a few exceptions, credit scores seem
to be a good enough metric that tell enough of a story about a borrower’s
credit worthiness to allow potential lenders and investors to decide whether
to risk their capital.151 There may be money to make in these riskier markets,
but the current crop of lenders does not yet have the incentives to take the
time and energy to develop that business.
B. The Consumer Assistance Industry
Firms elsewhere in the financial services market are positioning
148

ROCKET MORTGAGE, http://www.rocketmortgage.com/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2018).
Judge, supra note 137, at 625 (“Paying off an outstanding credit card balance with a three-year
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Karan Kaul, Will Fintech Innovation Benefit Borrowers of All Incomes?, URB. INST. (April 16,
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themselves to help unsophisticated and relatively less creditworthy home
buyers and mortgage borrowers. Examples include Zillow and Realtor.com
and their subsidiaries. Various firms also offer to help consumers track and
better understand their credit.152 This Section will identify aspects of those
businesses that BSIs could build upon, bringing together the strengths from
other sources of help for consumers while adding a layer of sophistication
that closes the gap between the borrowers and a successful, confident homebuying experience. I will then show how true BSIs would develop from
current business innovations.
1. Real Estate Help
Zillow is a large corporation that specializes in making real estate
information such as home prices and values easily accessible to buyers. Its
subsidiaries include Trulia, which is a real estate shopping website that
allows anyone on the Internet to browse real estate listings anywhere in the
country for free. In another spin-off, Zillow recently launched
RealEstate.com, a tool that takes an interesting approach to giving borrowers
more guidance about the costs of mortgage loans and what a prospective
borrower can afford on a given budget.153
RealEstate.com is targeted at first-time home buyers. It breaks down the
monthly cost of purchasing a home with specific dollar amounts for
individual fees and costs, including a utilities estimate, and provides users a
total monthly price to compare to rent payments.154 One immediate
shortcoming of the site in providing advice to borrowers is that it relies on
the borrower to set her own budget. The borrower must arrive at a
responsible view of what she can afford to pay each month on her own,
without guidance from the site. RealEstate.com compensates for errors the
borrower may make in budgeting by showing users homes well within and
below their budget and only showing a few properties near the top of their
budget.155 For example, using the traditional “two and a half times your
income” metric, let’s suppose a person making $200,000 per year could
afford a $500,000 home with a $3,000 monthly mortgage payment. Entering
$3,000 per month and $100,000 down into the RealEstate.com budget tool,
the most expensive property in the search was $500,000. The search results
began with properties priced as low as $45,000. A user can overcome this
by searching for a price range for the total list price rather than focusing on
152
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Home, BUS. INSIDER (May 2, 2017, 9:00 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/zillow-launchesrealestatecom-for-millennials-2017-5.
154
REALESTATE.COM, http://www.realestate.com/ (last visited June 8, 2017) (“Our All-In Monthly
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monthly cost, but that would not take advantage of the chief advertised
benefit of RealEstate.com, which is the help it provides in understanding
how a particular mortgage payment would fit within a given budget, and
would duplicate searches available on all other real estate listing sites.
Strongly biasing search results to come in well below budget shifts the
paradigm used by most home buyers, their real estate agents, and their
mortgage lenders when searching for suitable homes. Many buyers may be
biased in favor of finding the largest, most expensive home they can possibly
afford. Real estate agents who want to close deals are unlikely to talk such
buyers down. Buyers want larger homes with more amenities, real estate
agents want larger commissions, and lenders like to write big loans with high
interest rates. That kind of behavior contributed to the housing bubble and
resulting crisis.156 Such over-optimism can lead to foreclosure. Designed to
provide advice for first-time home buyers, RealEstate.com seems to be
nudging buyers toward shopping conservatively by drawing their attention
to all they can find for far less than the most they could possibly manage—
or not manage—to pay.157
A disinterested third party focused on giving advice can try to nudge
homebuyers in a more responsible direction. Zillow’s main home appraisal
estimation business has become a key player in helping homeowners decide
when to sell their homes and can act as a supplement to home-buying
research in a given area. One could imagine Zillow and RealEstate.com
putting together a suite of online applications that serve as a valuable source
of advice and information as homebuyers approach the market. Armed with
the tools such applications could provide, borrowers may be more
sophisticated in their dealings with lenders and may have a better idea of
how much they should borrow and on what terms. For instance, they could
know in advance what their monthly payments and fees would look like and
would be less likely to be surprised by higher-than-expected monthly
mortgage bills. These kinds of tools may educate borrowers and
simultaneously stifle some over-optimism. Further, because they will have
looked thoroughly at a number of homes that are below budget for them,
home buyers might be less likely to run to the upper-reaches of their
financial limits.
Another innovative source of home buying advice is Doorstepsbuy.com,
which is owned by Realtor.com. There, buyers create profiles any time
156
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See Casey Fleming, Rent vs. Buy: Are You Ready to Own Your First Home?, REALESTATE.COM,
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during the home-buying process, up to years before the buyer is ready to
make a purchase. The profiles capture information such as what sort of home
the buyers are looking for, geographical areas of interest, and the features
that are most important to them. Consumers also input information about
their finances and are able to put together all of the information they will
need for the mortgage application in their Doorsteps profile. Real estate
agents and lenders can then pay a monthly fee to have a presence on
Doorsteps that allows them to access their customers’ profiles to collect the
information they need to serve their clients. Doorsteps does not charge home
buyers, and its claimed services include:
100% unbiased information, written by industry experts and
insiders, so you can avoid all the homebuying mistakes that
helped worsen the housing crisis of the last ten years. That
includes overpaying for a home, a mortgage, or any one of the
dozens of service providers you’ll need along the way. It also
means finding the right people to support you – like inspectors
or attorneys – and knowing they have the right information,
presented in the right way, to be as efficient and effective on
your behalf as possible.158
Doorsteps also provides help through a chat function that connects
directly to an in-house customer service agent.159 It is not clear how
Doorsteps would prevent someone from “overpaying for a home” or a
mortgage beyond giving conservative budget estimates once financial
information is entered, but giving advice with those concerns in mind and
orienting the buyer to the complicated process in a step-by-step way may
help to overcome a fair amount of a first time buyer’s lack of sophistication.
The Doorsteps mission shares some similarities with the goals of a BSI,
but Doorsteps simply provides a platform for consumer communication with
agents and lenders as well as generic advice which may be tailored to address
particular financial profiles. It does not negotiate on consumers’ behalf or
otherwise involve itself in the process. It is a helpful platform but does not
go as far as a BSI could.
One could easily see how a BSI could grow from these companies that
provide advice and detailed information to consumers. Interest in their
services indicates market interest for a BSI. These models for consumer
information and advice represent helpful starting points for how a BSI could
interact with buyers and help them understand the process while gaining
enough information about a buyer to help the buyer find the right loan. As
the next section will show, any company with access to a great deal of
consumer data will have a natural advantage in taking steps to establish a
158
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BSI.
2. Credit Help
Borrowers would benefit from advice serving their best interests, giving
them the value of others’ experience and savvy. Loan originators and banks
that make mortgage loans have seen enough loans and loan applications to
know what circumstances are most likely to lead to default and foreclosure;
they know safe loans from risky loans and under what circumstances riskier
loans may work out.160 The benefit of that experience is rarely used to help
borrowers make decisions that are best for borrowers. The incentives for
loan originators are not aligned to encourage them to help borrowers.
Competing with banks may be what it takes to encourage lenders to serve
borrower needs beyond traditional financing.
Using BSIs for consumer borrowing is not just a matter of adopting a
different mindset when originating loans, it requires involving different
actors in lending decisions. BSIs should be able to identify borrowers
presenting different degrees of credit risk and to evaluate them to determine
what kinds of loans make the most sense for them. A number of market
participants have the raw materials necessary to develop the models that
would be helpful in predicting the success of various loans.161 They may be
able to sell that information to potential BSIs, but conflicts of interest may
prevent them from doing so in a way that would benefit borrowers.
Credit reporting bureaus are examples of firms with detailed financial
information about prospective borrowers and sophisticated algorithms that
predict borrower behavior and likelihood of repayment.162 Indeed, tracking
and predicting creditworthiness is their main function.163 Credit reporting
agencies lack the connections to borrowers and banks that would lead to
them becoming captured by one or the other.164 A credit reporting agency
would have a natural advantage in predicting what kind of home loan a
particular borrower could repay and would be well-positioned to sell that
information to interested parties. Because they place a premium on their
ability to accurately predict borrowers’ creditworthiness, credit reporting
agencies would not be tempted to recommend borrowers for more
aggressive loans than a given borrower could afford.
But it would be difficult for a credit reporting agency to build
relationships with lenders and investors and to market themselves as
helpers—rather than gatekeepers—to borrowers. It would require adding a
160
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completely different division to their business and may include changing the
goals of their credit modeling. Rather than warning lenders about which
borrowers to stay away from, a matchmaking credit reporting agency would
be trying to help even the less creditworthy borrowers find appropriate
mortgage loans. That may undermine their central purpose of providing
reliable predictions about how borrowers will behave and would present a
conflict of interest that may be insurmountable.
A better use of credit reporting agency data and modeling would be to
create a division within the agency that sells specialized models to
prospective lenders and BSIs. One important, though recently controversial,
innovation of credit reporting agencies has been to sell credit monitoring
subscriptions that give borrowers constant access to their credit reports and
FICO scores.165 The promise of honest communication with borrowers about
how lenders see them and where they stand when applying for loans is an
important step that could close some of the sophistication gap between
borrowers and lenders. In addition to credit tracking, a subscription for credit
monitoring could tell borrowers what loan terms lenders are most likely to
offer them as well as what loan terms they are most likely to be able to repay,
at what cost, and over what period of time. The trove of information credit
agencies have on hand is exceptionally valuable to both borrowers and
lenders, and the agencies are just beginning to learn how best to sell that
information to interested parties.
Credit agencies cannot go quite far enough to truly close the information
gap. The car sales market demonstrates some of the difficulty of having third
parties provide pricing information to consumers. For example, consumers
can look to Edmunds to appraise their cars for private sale or trade-in and
can look at True Car to see the best prices others are receiving in their
geographic area, but neither Edmunds nor True Car is available to actually
provide that price to the conscientious consumer.166 Consumers can share
those numbers with car dealers, and while that information may inform the
negotiation or may even pressure the car dealer to some extent, at the end of
the day, the car dealer can name a price and the consumer cannot turn to the
third party firm to get the better deal it claims should be available.167 So even
if a credit reporting agency says a borrower is qualified for a particular loan
or should be able to receive a particular interest rate, that does not provide
165
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any assurance that the borrower will be able to succeed in finding a loan on
those terms.
The recent dustup between the credit reporting agencies and the CFPB
shows that the agencies are very comfortable telling borrowers what they
want to hear on one hand while promising to be good gatekeepers for lenders
on the other.168 Mortgage lenders also obtain far more information about a
borrower’s financial situation than a credit reporting agency does or could.
So while the agency’s metrics may work in broad strokes to convey
information about where a borrower fits on a spectrum of borrowers based
on past repayment behavior and outstanding credit, there is important
information the credit bureaus may not have—current income, a new job not
yet begun, a recent job loss, a recent marriage, a large loan or gift from a
family member, or an inheritance—that would be essential to making a
mortgage lending decision.
Of course, the credit agencies could easily offer the information to
borrowers, which could serve the purpose of making the borrower a betterinformed negotiator and shopper when looking to buy a home. The borrower
could enter detailed information into a credit agency’s form as part of her
credit monitoring service and gain a better understanding of what kind of
borrower she is and what her budget is before she begins shopping for a
home. The credit agencies could use their data and models to put that
information in a form the borrower could easily use without attaching the
advice to a particular lender, loan, or property. That would have the
advantage of giving the borrower some of the information she needs without
attendant social pressure from a real estate agent, a mortgage lender
recommended by a real estate agent, or the desire for a particular home.
BSIs could provide that service or buy the necessary data and algorithms
from credit agencies. They could combine those resources with a long-term
relationship with their borrowers to create an increasingly detailed and
accurate picture of their borrowers over time so that the BSI could become
an advisor upon whom the borrower relies again and again. The BSI’s
interest in the long-term relationship with borrowers and the superior
effectiveness of their product when part of a long-term relationship would
help to protect borrowers against capture of the BSI by lenders. A BSI’s
desire and incentives not to set its borrowers up for failure would also give
lenders a place to go for responsible, well-vetted borrowers, lowering their
costs of research and lending.
BSIs may be tech firms, they may be financial advisors, or they may be
168
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off-shoots of lenders. They may have any number of ways of signaling their
incentives to borrowers and lenders. They may specialize in creating credit
models and then using those models to match borrowers to the best loans for
those with certain characteristics. Or instead, they might focus on customer
service, offering a supportive borrowing experience with handcrafted loan
products funded by outside lenders. In the likely regulation-free days ahead,
there will be money to be made in finding ways to help borrowers
responsibly navigate large personal financial transactions without winding
up in a housing crisis, a credit crisis, or mass foreclosures. In the next Part,
this Article suggests one specific way to provide that good.
V. A BUYERS’ SIDE INTERMEDIARY
The BSIs proposed by this Article would be a market response to a
problem caused by a market flaw exacerbated by flaws in regulation. In an
attempt to protect borrowers, regulation has mandated detailed disclosures
of the terms that apply to mortgage loans.169 The disclosure is more than
borrowers can easily read and understand, and the complexity of loan terms
makes it difficult for borrowers to make informed choices about their
mortgage loans. Moreover, the regulation is expensive for lenders, so it
raises the costs of new lenders entering the market.170 As in other industries,
mortgage intermediaries were allowed to grow in prominence as their roles
and methods of payment became specifically enshrined in regulation. Every
party consumers encounter in the mortgage borrowing process either works
for lenders, or, at best, offers generalized advice about how the borrowing
process usually works, with little individual consideration of borrowers’
interests.171 But there is room for disruptive innovation—for the market to
begin to operate differently. BSIs could avoid the high costs of regulation
by not becoming lenders or mortgage brokers themselves and could serve as
learned intermediaries who help borrowers understand the terms that govern
their mortgages.
BSIs could operate as independent third parties to loan transactions.
They could fill a market void by providing superior service and advice to a
more diverse population of borrowers than banks currently serve. They
could take care to have on hand a number of loan products from different
banks to connect with their borrowers depending on the borrower’s needs.
As third-party actors, BSIs would avoid some of the incentives lenders have
169
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that lead them to make loans to borrowers on troublesome terms. Freed from
pressure to make a large number of expensive loans, BSIs would be able to
give advice based on a particular borrower’s best interests, even offering
conservative advice about how a borrower should proceed. A BSI would
provide lenders with borrowers well suited to loan products individual
lenders offer. Such borrowers, ideally, would have a lower rate of default
than those screened less carefully or those screened using less accurate
assumptions about creditworthiness. Banks would continue to lend on their
own, but might “subscribe” to a stream of borrowers identified and
counseled by a BSI. Such an arrangement, providing banks with borrowers
in varying financial circumstances, would allow experimentation with new
ways banks could outsource the identification and vetting of borrowers.
A. What Would BSIs Do?
BSIs are most likely to begin as small start-up operations. Large banks
are unlikely to design new mechanisms for originating mortgage loans
because they already have substantial mortgage businesses and they are
subject to regulation that makes it difficult and expensive for them to
innovate. Large banks are able to do “enough” mortgage business using
traditional methods and would lack the inclination and perhaps the time to
develop mechanisms for finding overlooked borrowers. Giving into path
dependence would allow banks to originate loans more quickly. That, in
turn, would allow them to lend to more borrowers and generate a volume of
investment that should allow sufficient diversification to protect the banks
from loan-specific risk. For large banks, high volume of loans is the goal.
Smaller operations can focus more on the quality and specific
characteristics of the loans they make because they will not be able to
compete with banks on volume. They will be able to gain an advantage in
different parts of the market by identifying alternative ways of doing
business that may be more appealing to borrowers and investors. Innovation
is how small firms compete with large, multinational banks. They have the
appetite for risk-taking, as well as the flexibility to shift directions quickly
to adapt to changing circumstances or setbacks.
The chief benefit BSIs can market to lenders is the identification of
creditworthy borrowers. The cost of acquiring borrowers is part of a bank’s
lending business. BSIs would have to acquire new borrowers for banks at
either a lower cost than the bank could alone or at a cost preserving the
profitability of lending money to those borrowers. There has to be a reason
to pay to subscribe to a BSI’s stream of borrowers. BSIs should start by
identifying corners of the market in which they can specialize by producing
borrowers that lenders may otherwise have trouble identifying or reaching.
For instance, a BSI would go to lenders and pitch its ability to identify
particularly creditworthy, but perhaps hesitant-to-buy, first-time
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homebuyers. A BSI may be able to draw lenders in with its specialty in a
particular kind of desirable borrower and then offer to connect the lender
with carefully-vetted subprime or Alt-A borrowers. The goal would be to
develop an ability to identify and cultivate borrowers and to offer to connect
lenders to that part of the market in ways they may not otherwise be able to
connect themselves.
Then, just as securities underwriter would do, the BSI would negotiate
the terms of the loans the lender would offer its borrowers. For example, a
BSI might negotiate three loan products with each of three banks. A BSI
could match its borrowers to loans from a number of lenders, but may only
have one kind of loan it offers to borrowers with particular characteristics.
That is, a borrower with a credit score of 600 who is buying a home for the
first time and has selected a home well within her budget would be a good
match for Loan One from Lender A, while the same borrower spending more
money on her home might be a better fit for Loan Three from Lender B.
BSIs would negotiate the loan products it recommends to its borrowers,
organize those borrowers into groups according to their individual financial
characteristics—determined by the BSI’s proprietary modeling of
borrowers—and then match borrowers from the various groups to the loans
that suit them best. Once the BSI finds the right match for that loan product,
it puts the borrower and lender in touch so they can complete the transaction,
having vetted each for the other and having advised the borrower about what
the loan terms mean and how to proceed.
The BSI provides a service for the lender as well as the borrower by
negotiating a loan product it thinks it can place with the right kind of
borrowers. The BSI’s superior knowledge of borrowers helps the lender
create a loan product with particular buyers in mind. The BSI also performs
a service for borrowers by negotiating appropriate loans on their behalf,
saving them from having to navigate loan terms they can’t understand or
accurately price for themselves. They may still have a choice among
multiple-loan-products, but the BSI will be able to put those choices in
172
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perspective so the borrower can understand. For instance, sharing with the
borrower anticipated risk of default for loan options can provide the
borrower confidence about which choices would be responsible and
affordable.
The borrowers would benefit from being “discovered” by the BSI, and
the stamp of approval from the BSI may help them borrow on better terms
than may be available to them otherwise. BSIs would do well to maintain
long-term relationships with their borrowers when they can. Not only does
that provide a counterbalance to their long-term relationships with lenders,
but it also provides multiple opportunities to conduct business with the
borrowers as they borrow money over the course of their lives. BSIs would
not be limited to helping borrowers with mortgages. Borrowers would
benefit from being “BSI Borrowers” as that may give them access to more
and better loans and help them navigate the credit markets in a more
sophisticated way. With a trustworthy source of advice and access to
appropriate loans, “BSI Borrowers” may find access to the comforts of the
middle class without losing everything for obligating themselves to debt
they cannot service.
A BSI should develop a reliable model that measures the riskiness of the
loans offered to each borrower. That kind of transparency would be useful
to both borrowers and lenders. Borrowers could easily understand how risky
their loans are, which will give them valuable information about whether to
borrow under particular terms. Borrowers could choose from a variety of
home price, APR, and payment term combinations and easily see which
combination would be the most challenging and how likely they are to be
able to repay each option. If APR were more accurate, the relative riskiness
of various options might be even clearer to borrowers. But many borrowers
focus on monthly payments in the near term and may not understand how
risky a payment may become in the longer term.173 Bond issuers receive a
rating before the offering that tells them, and the market, how risky the bonds
are. Mortgage borrowers would benefit from similarly clear information
about the risks loans present, not just to lenders, but to the borrowers
themselves. The subjective harms of home foreclosure are much more
significant to a borrower than the risk of default is to a well-diversified
lender. Of course, some borrowers and lenders will still choose to take big
risks. The market should work more efficiently if everyone understands how
big of a risk they are choosing with their investment decisions.
Transparency, not just disclosure—and perhaps, as opposed to disclosure—
is the goal.
Of course, as Levitin has pointed out, such information is only truly
useful to lenders and investors if the BSI can accurately model the credit risk
173

Bar-Gill, Consumer Contracts, supra note 46, at 776.

198

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1

174

posed by borrowers with those attributes. One problem with developing
such models is that they can take time to devise and refine before they are
reliable, and the factors affecting them may change too quickly for the model
to keep up.175 The riskiness of investments in mortgages is a dynamic
variable. It is difficult to pinpoint the stability of the market or the riskiness
of investments in it even when considering only traditional loans and
securities. Defining classes of borrowers who would not necessarily receive
loans on the traditional market would present a new difficulty. BSIs’
borrowers would not necessarily have the same risk profile as other
subprime borrowers because BSIs would take care to find borrowers with
special characteristics and match them to appropriate loans, making them
more likely than other subprime borrowers to repay. BSIs would also,
ideally, design or lead borrowers to loans that would improve the chance of
repayment.
While BSIs would be able to develop useful, individualized profiles of
borrowers, they would not take the time or effort nor incur the costs of longterm personalized counseling. That is, they would offer generalized advice
appropriate to a borrower with a specific financial profile and would be
available to offer individual advice when needed. But BSIs are not handholders. To extend the metaphor a bit, a BSI advises on a good match, but is
not the borrower’s best friend and confidant. To update the metaphor, a BSI
is eHarmony to banks’ Tinder.176 A BSI’s strength is its propriety modeling
of borrowers, collecting particular information and weighting it
appropriately to arrive at a better assessment of the borrower’s finances than
is otherwise available. That information can help the BSI provide general
advice for all borrowers with similar financial attributes and also to provide
specific advice as needed based on the financial characteristics the BSI has
ascertained. BSIs are not likely to invest in hours-long conversations with
borrowers over the course of months or years about the benefits of particular
homes to buy, particular financial decisions outside of the mortgage or other
loan being matched, or life generally.
A chief difficulty facing BSIs as small-scale, “specialist” actors in the
mortgage market would be finding metrics to identify the borrower
174
Adam J. Levitin et al., The Dodd-Frank Act and Housing Finance: Can It Restore Private Risk
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I am indebted to Manuel Utset for this observation. For those who don’t know, eHarmony uses
a long questionnaire to evaluate its users and match them to each other based on carefully calculated
assessments of personality traits, and what traits may be compatible. Tinder simply provides a platform
for users to see photographs of other users and then match to each other quickly to begin a conversation.
Tinder users make their first assessments based on appearance and are not aided by an algorithmic
modeling of their personalities or their compatibility with other users.
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population that the traditional banks are missing. As Kathryn Judge pointed
out in an article about fintech lending, P2P lenders that started with the goal
of disrupting lending actually fell back to using traditional metrics and
lending to traditional prime borrowers.177 Enticing investors to lend outside
of the mainstream can be difficult. Safe investments are generally easier to
market. But more personalized lending could help to resolve market failures.
The potential is there if only the right entrepreneurs figure out how best to
calculate and execute the risk.
BSIs, as described here, would not be classified as mortgage brokers
because they would not originate loans. That would allow them to avoid a
large swath of expensive regulation and open up the ways in which they
could communicate and negotiate with lenders in the interests of borrowers.
The next Section details elements of BSI compensation that will be
important to help avoid the perverse incentives other intermediaries have
given into in the past.
B. BSI Compensation
Maintaining a BSI’s independence would be crucial to providing a new
market actor that could avoid many of the dangerous pitfalls that seem
inevitably to lead large-scale consumer lending to failure. A BSI must not
have incentives to make improvident loans or to put borrowers in the riskiest,
most expensive loans their incomes and credit scores can possibly justify.
This section suggests contract-based mechanisms to ensure a BSI’s
independence. A BSI’s independence will depend, in large part, on how the
BSI is paid. Any number of contracts with borrowers and lenders could
define a BSI’s pay in a manner to preserve its independence or to provide it
with the “right” incentives, whatever the borrowers and lenders decide those
incentives should be. One could imagine a variety of schemes competing
before determining which incentives and pay structures attract the most
borrowers and lenders to the BSI’s services.
In one possible payment arrangement, the BSI would collect flat fees
from the borrower and the lender. The borrower would pay a small fee that
might vary depending on the complexity, but not necessarily the dollar value
of the loan. Loans with variable interest rates, interest-only loans, loans that
require private mortgage insurance, loans with no or low down payments,
jumbo loans, etc. would qualify as more complex than, say, twenty percent
down, thirty-year fixed rate mortgages. A borrower could be given a choice
among different loans—a simple, easily affordable loan and more complex,
more expensive loans. The fee paid to the BSI would be higher for the more
complex loans, both to discourage the borrower from taking the more
complex loan and to signal the higher risk the borrower would be taking by
choosing the more expensive loan. More complex loans may also require
177
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more work on the part of the BSI, both administratively and in finding a
matching lender, so the higher fee could also be justified that way.
Lenders could “subscribe” to a BSI’s services by paying a subscription
fee for making their loans available to the BSI’s borrowers. The fee could
vary in size depending on how many borrowers the lender is matched to or
how many loans the lender negotiates with the BSI for offer to the BSI’s
borrowers. In order to convince lenders to take new risks on BSI borrowers,
BSIs may have to guarantee some early loans, at least for a few years. While
that would align the BSI’s interests with a lender’s interest in being repaid,
it would not give BSIs incentives to match borrowers to excessively risky
loans and would also align the BSI’s interests with the borrower’s interest
in not suffering a foreclosure. In order to maintain independence, it is
important that the BSI’s pay be connected to neither the amount of the loan
nor the riskiness of the loan.178 The effect of the higher fee BSIs would
receive for complex, and so perhaps riskier, loans should be overcome by
borrower preferences not to pay a higher fee and the BSI’s responsibility for
guaranteeing some early loans.
An important feature of the arrangement between lenders and BSIs
would be a reduction in the fees lenders pay for loans that default or are in
arrears at the end of the given time period. Such a term would enhance the
BSI’s incentives to make loans borrowers can afford and to vet borrowers
carefully, and it would give lenders some assurance that the BSI is, in fact,
being careful. In a way, the BSI would have to stand by its product,
compensating the lender for harms resulting from putting the wrong
borrowers in the wrong loans. As mentioned above, a BSI may have to
guarantee some or all of the loans it matches at the outset. But after that
period is over and lenders have more confidence in the BSI’s track record,
this kind of fee arrangement could ensure that BSIs have some skin in the
game.
C. New Ways to Help Borrowers
One way to pursue the goal of maintaining long-term relationships with
borrowers would be to help them with more than just borrowing. BSIs could
help borrowers save for a down payment and perhaps use that saving
function as a way to give itself borrower-side incentives. For example, a BSI
could set up low interest savings accounts that borrowers could then use as
down payments for homes. Interest earned by the BSI from the deposits
would help fund the work BSIs do on borrowers’ behalf. Then, perhaps,
178
However, the lender and BSI may define a loan of a particular size, say a “jumbo” loan, that
might pay the BSI more. Loans that are large are unlikely to be given to borrowers who are not prime
and who are not able to put down considerable amounts. While there may still be a potential for abuse, it
is much smaller and borrowers shopping in that neighborhood are likely to be wealthier and more
sophisticated than average.
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from the same pool of returns, BSIs could offer some degree of matching
when the money is used for a down payment, thereby giving the borrower
incentives to go through with buying a home and using that money for the
down payment.
Funds distributed from a Roth IRA will not be taxed as income if they
are used for a down payment on a first home.179 A similar tax exemption
could apply to funds withdrawn from similar BSI accounts. Such legislative
incentives to use BSIs would be akin to the regulatory breaks companies like
Uber can get by serving underserved populations.180 In order to maintain the
favorable tax treatment, BSIs could commit to focusing a certain percentage
of their business on certain underserved borrowers.
Another step BSIs might take is to insure the borrower against the risk
of foreclosure. Private mortgage insurance currently protects lenders against
the risk default of underwater mortgages.181 Borrowers have even more to
lose from an inability to pay their mortgages and have no similar protection.
Of course, protection against an inability to pay one’s mortgage could create
a serious moral hazard, discouraging people from paying even if they can,
but that result would just be a matter of arriving at the right price and the
right terms for the right benefit. For example, the borrower could be insured
up to a certain amount of the down payment, which represents many
people’s life savings up to that point in their lives. So, if a home is foreclosed
upon, the borrower might be able to collect from the insurance a certain
amount of that cash outlay to allow them to find and get into a new place to
live. BSIs would have to set premiums and the circumstances under which
the insurance would pay out carefully, perhaps working in conjunction with
lenders to find the right balance. But such a scheme might really help the
honest but unfortunate homeowner.
BSIs would add value to the mortgage lending market in several ways.
First, small, relatively nimble internet companies with low overhead would
be able to devote time and attention to finding borrowers who would
otherwise be locked out of the mortgage loan market. Recent regulation may
have left some worthy borrowers without banks willing to lend to them and
BSIs can fill that gap.182 Most importantly, BSIs would have incentives to
serve both borrowers and investors in the loans. To attract the best
borrowers, a BSI would have to develop a reputation for designing
179
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consumer-friendly loans—loans that the borrower could reasonably be
expected to repay on reasonable terms the borrower can easily understand.
In order to attract equity investors, BSIs would have to attract lenders to
have loan products to offer their borrowers on favorable terms. BSIs would
have to be able to describe the risk presented by an investment in each kind
of loan it offers. As with any matchmaking situation, the BSI is only
successful if the parties are happy to have found each other.
VI. LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO SUPPORT BSIS
If BSIs catch on, they will surely be regulated. Significant players in
financial markets always are. Fintech firms and other starts-ups often meet
with regulators early in the lives of their new businesses to lobby for
regulations that will keep them honest, but allow them to operate profitably
and compete with existing firms.183 It is important for any new player to have
an idea of how regulation could protect and affect its business model. This
Part will consider legal rules, both common law and potential regulation,
that would support a BSI’s mission while protecting consumers from the
risks they face in interacting with an intermediary in the mortgage market.
It is important that common law doctrines of contract enforcement and
fiduciary duty be allowed to dominate to the extent possible. Specifically
regulating a new intermediary locks in certain aspects of that intermediary’s
business, whether good or bad for consumers, and stifles innovation and
change.
Relationships between BSIs and borrowers and BSIs and lenders would
be contractual. Contracts with lenders would be negotiated by sophisticated
parties and are not likely to require special attention. Gaps in those contracts
would be filled by the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The primary relationship that requires attention and protection is the
fiduciary relationship between BSIs and borrowers. Because BSIs will be
agents and advisors of borrowers, they must be held to fiduciary standards.
A buyers’ side intermediary must unequivocally represent and work for
buyers. Fiduciary obligation will bar BSIs from conflicts of interest for
which they do not have the borrower’s consent.184 It will work to allow
courts to rule against and provide remedies for deals BSIs may make with
lenders that compromise borrowers’ interests. Because fiduciary
enforcement is flexible and post hoc, it provides a means to address any kind
of arrangement that gives BSIs interests that conflict with those of
borrowers, however unpredictable. The flexibility the common law doctrine
of fiduciary obligation provides is ideal for an emerging industry that may
183

Pollman & Barry, supra note 12, at 406–08.
Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 224 (2005) (arguing
that fiduciaries consent to forego self-interested behavior); Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary
Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 926 (2006).
184

2019]

MARKET-BASED INNOVATION IN CONSUMER PROTECTION

203

grow and change faster than regulation can be enacted. It also allows BSIs
to experiment with a variety of arrangements while sorting the good from
the bad.
Though fiduciary duties can be considered catch-all gap-fillers,
fiduciary relationships can benefit from broad, expressive regulatory
guidance. Professional responsibility standards, for example, inform
fiduciary relationships between doctors and lawyers and their patients and
clients.185 Regulation of BSIs could state what goals a BSI should pursue in
good faith and also specify the kinds of conflicts of interest BSIs would be
prohibited from engaging in and from waiving. A regulatory statement of
BSIs’ purposes would have expressive value by guiding the industry to
comply with norms for its behavior.186 BSIs should work in good faith to
find affordable loans for the borrowers they help, to match borrowers to
loans that are suitable for the borrower’s financial condition, to provide
borrowers a realistic view of their individual budgets, and to negotiate loan
products with simple terms are that are appropriate for that borrower’s
financial literacy. The notion of suitability has a securities regulation
analog—brokers must only recommend securities that are suitable for a
given client’s financial circumstances.187 Once these standards are
articulated, they can give shape to a borrower cause of action to remedy
injuries suffered as a result of sharp dealing by a BSI.
The legal framework suggested here should serve as a useful starting
place that will not burden a new industry with overly-specific rules. I
intentionally do not suggest specific standards for determining who may
serve as a BSI or how a firm might “qualify” to become a BSI. Lenders and
venture capitalists are likely to provide a good check on inexperienced or
inappropriate entities trying to become BSIs. Lenders simply will not do
business with unqualified entities. Licensing requirements also tend to be
overly burdensome and expensive, and there is no indication yet that detailed
licensing rules would be necessary here. Such regulation should be
considered if and when it becomes necessary, and by then the precise nature
of that regulation would be more apparent.
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CONCLUSION
Consumer borrowers are largely unprepared for the complex financial
transaction that accompanies buying a home. Consumer regulation has been
enacted to try to help borrowers understand mortgage loans better, but those
regulations have fallen short and are likely to be repealed in the near term.
Low-income borrowers are underserved, and banks have failed to find
innovative ways to reach them without engaging in the irresponsible lending
that led to the last financial crisis. The market is ripe for a business to step
in to solve this problem—to serve and help borrowers and to connect them
to lenders through carefully chosen loan products that consumers can
understand and afford.
The BSIs suggested by this Article would be a market solution to this
problem. Tech companies and firms that operate in the consumer financial
markets have devised new ways to serve consumer borrowers. A BSI can
help borrowers overcome their relative lack of sophistication while putting
borrowers in mortgages they have a good chance of repaying as agreed. The
flexible common law provides the necessary tools to protect borrowers and
allow growth and innovation in the new industry. Regulation should only
broadly supplement the common law, not replace it. Regulation should not
step in to specifically define BSIs or the rules they must follow. Such
specific regulation tends to entrench high costs and to create a harmful path
dependence that keeps markets in intermediaries from adjusting to better suit
the needs of the less sophisticated parties they purport to represent.

